Decision
Ms Y and Tusla
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-200101-A0A0H4
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-200101-A0A0H4
Published on
Whether Tusla was justified, under section 15(1)(c) of the FOI Act, in refusing access to records relating to the applicant’s interactions with Tusla, on the ground that granting the request would cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with or disruption of its work
14 April 2026
The applicant is represented by a solicitor in this matter and therefore all references to the applicant in this decision should be taken to include correspondence with the applicant’s solicitor where appropriate.
In October 2024, a solicitor representing the applicant made a request to Tusla on his client’s behalf for a complete copy of her records. Tusla refused that request on 12 March 2025 on the basis that it considered it voluminous. The applicant’s representative did not apply for an internal review of Tusla’s decision within the timeframe specified by the Act and Tusla accordingly closed the case.
On 19 September 2025, referring to the correspondence and conversations regarding the October 2024 request, the applicant’s representative submitted the current request. The representative said that, as Tusla had deemed the October 2024 request to be voluminous, he was now submitting a specific request. The representative listed over 101 separate categories of records, running to over four pages, and ranging in time from 2021 to the date of the request.
On 13 October 2025, Tusla wrote to the representative, stating that, from a preliminary examination of relevant records held, it considered the request voluminous, warning that, as such, it stood to be refused under section 15(1)(c) of the Act. Tusla offered to assist the representative to refine the request so that it would no longer be voluminous, suggesting, as an example, that this could be done by restricting it to records relating to a specific time period.
On 28 October 2025, the representative replied to Tusla saying that he was not in a position to further reduce the scope of his request. In his letter, he referred to correspondence between himself and Tusla in the context of the October 2024 request, stating that he had already gone to great lengths to refine the latter in the current request. He said that he could not further refine it because his client’s file needed to be given to an expert for review. On 11 November 2025, Tusla acknowledged the representative’s letter, apologising for its delayed reply and explaining that the staff member handling the request was on leave and would respond upon her return. On 19 November 2025, the representative wrote again to Tusla, reiterating that he could not reduce the scope of the request any further.
On 1 December 2025, Tusla refused the request under section 15(1)(c) of the Act. In its decision, Tusla noted the representative’s position that he could not further refine his request. Tusla stated that it remained fully committed to assisting him in obtaining his client’s records and that, if after consultation with his client, he decided to amend and resubmit, it would provide further assistance.
On 18 December 2025, the applicant’s representative requested an internal review of Tusla’s original decision, reiterating that he could not refine the request any further. He referred, once more, to the closed October 2024 request, stating that, in the context of the latter, there had been an agreement between Tusla and his office to provide 1,000 pages of his client’s records per month but that when this did not happen, he had engaged once more with Tusla. He said that, following this re-engagement, Tusla had once again asked him to refine and particularise the request and that he had eventually agreed to return with a schedule of required records in September 2025 when Tusla persisted in refusing to accept his request for his client’s full file.
On 15 January 2026, Tusla affirmed its original decision, stating that processing the 10,000 records requested would take it more than five months.
On 22 January 2026, the applicant’s representative applied to this Office on behalf of his client for a review of Tusla’s internal review decision. In his application, the representative substantially repeated what he had said in his application to Tusla for internal review, concluding that he could not further attempt to reduce the scope of his request.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the correspondence outlined above, and to the correspondence between this Office and both parties on the matter. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
This review is concerned solely with whether Tusla was justified in refusing the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(c) of the FOI Act.
Before I address the substantive issues arising, I would like to make a number of preliminary comments.
Firstly, I consider it important to deal at this point with the applicant’s representative’s references to the October 2024 FOI request. As noted above, in this request the representative had asked for his client’s full Tusla file. After an exchange of correspondence between the applicant’s representative and Tusla, which has been provided to this Office by Tusla, on 12 March 2025 the latter refused that request under section 15(1)(c) of the Act. I note that section 21(7) of the FOI Act states that an application for a review must be made not later than four weeks after the notification of the decision. The applicant’s legal representative did not request an internal review of this decision. Tusla confirmed to this Office that the same reference number was used for the October 2024 request as well as for the current request as part of an administrative decision for case management purposes and that this does not indicate that the October 2024 request remained open. As such, I consider the October 2024 request to be closed, and this review will only consider the request made by the applicant’s representative on 19 September 2025.
Secondly, in correspondence with this Office, the legal firm representing the applicant said that the purpose of requesting these records was to ensure that it could advise its client appropriately and brief the necessary expert with a view to preparing a comprehensive report. It is important to note that section 13(4) of the FOI Act provides that, subject to the legislation, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. Thus, while certain provisions of the FOI Act implicitly render the motive of the requester relevant, as a general rule, the actual or perceived reasons for a request must be disregarded in deciding whether to grant or refuse an access request under the FOI Act.
Section 15(1)(c) provides that an FOI body may refuse to grant a request where it considers that granting the request would, by reason of the number or nature of the records concerned or the nature of the information concerned, require the retrieval and examination of such number of records or an examination of such kind of records concerned as to cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with, or disruption of, work of the body. It should be noted that a refusal may be made on the basis of a disruption of the work of a particular functional area, and not necessarily on the basis of disruption of work of the body as a whole.
However, section 15(4) provides that a request cannot be refused under section 15(1)(c) unless the body has first assisted, or offered to assist, the requester in amending the request so that it no longer falls to be refused under that section. As such, before I consider whether Tusla was justified in refusing the request under section 15(1)(c), I must first consider whether it complied with the provisions of section 15(4) before doing so.
The FOI Act is silent on the precise nature or level of the assistance to be offered under section 15(4). This Office takes the view that before a body can refuse a request under section 15(1)(c), the body must first have provided reasonable assistance to the requester in amending the request, or have offered to provide assistance in cases where the requester is not willing to amend the original request, in order to comply with the requirements of section 15(4). On the question of what constitutes reasonable assistance, this Office considers that the level or nature of the assistance to be provided can vary significantly from case to case and will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. It will often also depend on the willingness of the parties to engage in meaningful discussion on what might be acceptable in the circumstances.
In the course of the review by this Office, the Investigating Officer sought submissions from Tusla with respect to why it considers that section 15(1)(c) applies. The Investigating Officer shared details of these submissions with the legal firm representing the applicant and offered it an opportunity to respond, which it duly did. While I do not propose to repeat the submissions from both parties in full here, I confirm that I have had regard to them for the purposes of this review.
In its submissions to this Office, Tusla provided information on the assistance it said it offered the applicant’s representative prior to refusing this request under section 15(1)(c). I note that as part of these submissions, Tusla referred to its interactions with the representative in the context of the October 2024 request. However, as the latter request is not the subject of this review, I do not propose to repeat what Tusla said in relation to such interactions or to take it into consideration as part of my decision.
With regard to the request at hand, Tusla said that having assessed the request received in September 2025, it considered it excessively voluminous and impractical to process within reasonable resources. According to Tusla, on 13 October 2025, the applicant’s representative was advised that the request as framed was voluminous and he was invited to engage in a process to reduce/scale down the scope. Tusla said that it advised the representative that the request scope could be refined by asking for records specific to a particular timeframe, e.g. records for the year 2021. According to Tusla, in correspondence dated 28 October 2025, the representative indicated that he could not reduce the scope of the request.
The Investigating Officer provided the representing legal firm with a summary of Tusla’s submissions and offered it the opportunity to make further submissions of its own, which it duly did. In its response, the firm did not specifically address the assistance provided by Tusla under section 15(4), except indirectly, by referring to an alleged agreement under the October 2024 request to release 1,000 pages per month over ten months as well as the submission of its refined request in September 2025, which, it says, required significant efforts both on its part and on the applicant’s part.
As noted earlier, this review is solely concerned with the September 2025 request and, as such, I can only consider engagement that occurred between Tusla and the representative within its context. While section 15(4) requires the FOI body to assist or offer to assist the requester in narrowing the scope of their request, this also involves meaningful engagement from the applicant to make the request more reasonable/manageable for the FOI body to process. The correspondence exchanged between the parties shows that, following Tusla’s 13 October 2025 offer to assist, the representative informed Tusla on 28 October 2025 that he was not in a position to refine his request any further than the schedule provided on 19 September 2025. As such, I am satisfied that Tusla fulfilled its obligation under section 15(4) to offer to assist the applicant in narrowing the scope of her request in order to avoid its refusal under section 15(1)(c).
Having established that Tusla first complied with section 15(4), I will now consider its reliance upon section 15(1)(c) to refuse this request.
In submissions to this Office, Tusla explained why it considers that processing this request would cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with or disruption of its work.
Tusla said that different teams have been involved with this case over a period of time and that, as a result, records relating to the applicant are stored across multiple teams in several different repositories in both paper and electronic form. Tusla explained that, while the Tusla case management system (TCM) that holds the majority of the records does contain search functionality, the system is primarily designed to organise Social Work records rather than to extract large volumes of records across multiple referrals and categories in response to information requests. Tusla said that, as such, although searches can be conducted within TCM, complete sets of records are not automatically generated in response to a request framed in very broad terms. Tusla said that all records relevant to the applicant’s request would have to be downloaded individually, manually reviewed and verified to cross-reference, schedule, redact and prepare the relevant records for release.
Tusla said that, in order to identify and retrieve all records falling within the scope of the request, multiple electronic and paper file locations would need to be searched, involving multiple Social Work Management, Privacy Network and Business Support and third-party teams. According to Tusla, each record would require careful examination on a page-by-page basis to identify personal data relating to third parties, sensitive information and any material requiring redaction. Tusla added that records would need to be cross-referenced across multiple files and systems to ensure that all records falling within scope are identified and that no relevant documentation is inadvertently omitted. According to Tusla, this process requires checking file correspondence trails and electronic and paper records against one another to confirm completeness. Tusla added that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the review process would also need to consider whether the release of particular material could potentially cause harm or distress to the minor at its centre, and whether disclosure would be in the minor’s best interests. According to Tusla, these considerations require careful professional Social Work judgement and cannot be determined without a detailed review of the records concerned.
Tusla said that a preliminary analysis indicates that the records falling within scope amount to approximately 10,000 pages. It broke down the various processing stages, including retrieving, reviewing, redacting and scheduling, and assigned the time in minutes per page that it claims would need to be devoted at each stage, based on what it called typical processing times. Tusla’s conclusion was that processing the request would take an estimated 1,207 hours of continuous working, involving Business Support, FOI Decision maker and Social Work staff. Tusla said this total would comprise 1,187 continuous FOI decision maker/administrative staff hours and 20 Social Work consultation hours. Tusla said that its FOI Unit is made up of 3.5 FOI decision makers. It said that staff within the Unit are responsible for managing multiple requests concurrently, in addition to other duties and noted that dedicated administrative support available to the Unit for processing of such requests is limited to approximately five hours per week. Tusla said that the allocation of this level of resource to a single request would represent a significant and disproportionate unreasonable burden on the unit and would have a direct and adverse impact on the Unit’s ability to process other FOI requests in a timely manner. With regard to the estimated 20 hours of Social Work consultation, Tusla said that the core function of Social Work is child protection, which is statutory in nature and requires prioritisation, adding that, from a Social Work perspective, providing 20 hours consultation would necessitate the diversion of significant resources away from core duties.
The Investigating Officer provided the applicant’s representing legal firm with details of Tusla’s submissions, offering it the opportunity to make further submissions, which it duly did. The applicant’s legal firm said that it always acknowledged that this was a significant request and engaged in a spirit of cooperation with Tusla, endeavoring to accommodate it at every point. It referred to what it calls the agreement to release the records over a ten-month period and to its efforts to resubmit its request containing what it considered the most important records. Finally, the firm said that it was at a loss to understand how the refined request also equates to approximately 10,000 pages.
As noted above, the FOI Act seeks to strike a balance between ensuring access to records and managing the administrative burden on FOI bodies in dealing with requests that require a significant allocation of time and resources. It should be noted that a refusal may be made on the basis of a disruption of the work of a particular functional area, and not necessarily the disruption of work of the body as a whole.
I note the representing firm’s surprise that, despite it requesting a specific set of records from the applicant’s full file, Tusla still considers that 10,000 pages are involved. However, I also note Tusla’s claim that when considered collectively, the current request effectively amounts to one for all the applicant’s records. I note that the request as submitted runs to over four pages and is for approximately 100 categories of records, seeking “all correspondence/statements/records, etc.” in respect of each category. I am therefore satisfied that the request is wide-ranging and that Tusla has demonstrated that processing it in full without refinement would cause significant disruption to the work of its FOI unit in particular. In its submissions, the legal firm did not contest the magnitude of the request, nor did it provide any argument to show that processing it would not represent an unreasonable burden on Tusla.
In the circumstances, having taken into consideration the submissions made by Tusla and the applicant’s representative, I accept that the time and resources that would be required to retrieve and examine the relevant records would cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with, and disruption of, Tusla’s work and specifically that of its FOI unit. Therefore, I am satisfied that Tusla was justified in refusing access to records falling within the scope of the applicant’s request on the basis of section 15(1)(c) of the Act.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm Tusla’s decision to refuse the applicant’s requests under section 15(1)(c) of the FOI Act. I find that processing the request would, without refinement, require the retrieval and examination of such number of records or an examination of such kind of records concerned as to cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with, or disruption of, the work of Tusla.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Mary Connery
Investigator