Decision
Ms. X and Housing Agency
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-156399-P8K0S8
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-156399-P8K0S8
Published on
Whether the Housing Agency was justified under section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act in refusing access to records relating to applications made to it by the applicant under statutory schemes for financial assistance available to homeowners affected by the Irish defective block crisis
15 October 2025
By way of context, the applicant is a homeowner whose property has been affected by the well-publicised Irish defective block crisis, relating to homes which have been damaged by the use of defective concrete blocks during their construction. As part of the government response to the crisis, and by way of the Remediation of Dwellings Damaged by the Use of Defective Concrete Blocks Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”), the Defective Concrete Blocks Scheme was established, under which affected homeowners can apply for financial support. This scheme was subsequently replaced by the Enhanced Defective Concrete Blocks Scheme (“the current scheme”), which provides for a broader and more comprehensive suite of remedial measures for affected homeowners. While it is not necessary here to go into the detail of either scheme, I note that the Housing Agency acts as agents to local authorities and has two main functions in relation to the current scheme: firstly, to determine whether or not a home meets the damage threshold for entry into the scheme, and secondly, to determine the appropriate remediation option and grant amount. For this purpose, the 2022 Act requires the Housing Agency to arrange for an engineer to assess relevant properties and make a report. The applicant has made applications to the Housing Agency under both the current scheme and its predecessor.
In an FOI request dated 18 August 2024, the applicant sought access to records relating to the Housing Agency’s consideration of, and decision on, her application under both schemes. The applicant also sought access to records relating to all relevant internal and external correspondence from 23 August 2022 to 5 June 2024, and specifically correspondence between the Housing Agency and Donegal County Council in relation to her application.
In its decision on the applicant’s request dated 14 October 2024, the Housing Agency part-granted her request , releasing certain records in full and refusing the remainder in whole or part pursuant to sections 29(1) (relating to the deliberative processes of an FOI body), 30(1)(a) (relating to the functions and negotiations of an FOI body) and 37(1) (relating to personal information) of the FOI Act. On 15 November 2024, the applicant sought an internal review of the Housing Agency’s decision in respect of some (but not all) of the records withheld by the Housing Agency. In its internal review decision of 9 December 2024, the Housing Agency upheld its decision to refuse access to the relevant records, although it varied the basis for this decision, no longer relying on sections 29(1), 30(1) or 37(1), but on section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act (relating to law enforcement and public safety). On 11 February 2025, the applicant sought a review by this Office of the Housing Agency’s decision on her request.
In the course of conducting this review, I noted that – notwithstanding the fact that the Housing Agency did not seek to rely on section 37(1) in its internal review decision – there appeared to be significant amounts of third-party personal information in one of the records at issue, as well as smaller amounts of personal information in the other records. I contacted the applicant on this point and she advised that she was happy for any third-party personal information that appears in the relevant records to be excluded from the scope of this review.
Furthermore, in the course of conducting this review I formed the opinion that the interests of a number of third-party entities would be potentially affected by the release of the records at issue. I therefore contacted these organisations to put each on notice of the existence of this review, and to invite each to make any submissions that they wished in relation to the matter. No submissions were received from any of the relevant third parties.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the submissions made by both parties to the review. I have also examined the records at issue. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
According to the schedule of records provided by the Housing Agency, it identified 34 records that fell within the scope of the applicant’s request. Of these, it released 18 in full and 11 in part, withholding in full the remaining five records. As noted above, in her application for an internal review, the applicant specified a number of records in respect of which she sought a review of the Housing Agency’s initial decision. The relevant records in respect of which the applicant sought an internal review, and which now fall to be considered as part of this review, are records 7, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33 and 34.
Subsequently, in the course of this review, the applicant indicated that upon further reflection she was dissatisfied with the Housing Agency’s decision to withhold a number of other records that fell within the scope of her FOI request – specifically, records 30, 31 and 32. However, in circumstances where these were not among the records in respect of which the applicant specifically sought an internal review of the Housing Agency’s initial decision, I am satisfied that I do not have a basis to examine the Housing Agency’s decision in relation to these additional records.
Accordingly, this review is solely concerned with whether the Housing Agency was justified, under section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act, in refusing access to records 7, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33 and 34.
Before I outline my analysis and findings in this matter, there are a number of preliminary points I wish to make. Firstly, I wish to highlight section 22(12)(b) of the FOI Act which, as the Housing Agency is aware, provides that a decision to refuse to grant an FOI request shall be presumed not to have been justified unless the FOI body satisfies the Information Commissioner that the decision was justified. This means that the onus is on the Housing Agency of satisfying this Office that its decision to refuse the request was justified in this case. In the case of The Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57, the Supreme Court found that the head of the FOI body dealing with the request must be conscious at all stages of the process that the overriding presumption is one of disclosure, with the result that any refusal to disclose must be fully reasoned and sufficiently coherent, fact specific, and logically connected to the document or record such that the justification is sufficient.
Furthermore, it should be noted that section 13(4) of the FOI Act provides that, subject to the legislation, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. Thus, while certain provisions of the FOI Act implicitly render the motive of the requester relevant, as a general rule, the actual or perceived reasons for a request must be disregarded in deciding whether to grant or refuse an access request under the FOI Act.
I also wish to note that this Office has no role in adjudicating on how FOI bodies perform their functions generally, nor to act as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism with respect to actions taken by FOI bodies. Our role in this case is confined to reviewing the Housing Agency’s decision regarding access to records 7, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33 and 34.
Moreover, it should be noted that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the legislation places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under FOI can be put. With certain limited exceptions provided for in the legislation which are not relevant here, FOI is not about granting access to information to particular individuals only and, as noted above, a requester's reasons for making a request are generally not of relevance. Thus, records are not released under FOI for any limited or restricted purpose.
Finally, it is important to note that, although I am obliged to give reasons for my decision, section 25(3) of the FOI Act requires me to take all reasonable precautions in the course of a review to prevent the disclosure of information contained in an exempt record. This means that the extent to which I can describe the contents of certain relevant records is limited.
Bearing in mind the requirements of section 25(3), the records which are the subject of this review can be described as follows.
• Record 7 is a spreadsheet containing summaries of options being considered for various properties affected by defective concrete blocks. It should be noted that only one entry in this spreadsheet refers to the applicant’s property. As set out above, the applicant has consented to the exclusion of third-party personal information from the scope of this review, and accordingly I need only consider the information in this record that relates to the applicant’s property.
• Record 21 is a draft chartered engineer’s report on the applicant’s property, dated May 2024.
• Record 22 is the same draft report with comments added by Housing Agency staff.
• Record 23 is the final version of the above draft report.
• Record 25 is a different version of the final report. From a comparison of the two versions, record 25 appears to be missing pages 191, 192 and 193. The reason for the existence of two differing versions of the report is not immediately apparent, but is not a matter to which I am required to consider in any detail.
• Record 33 is an internal Housing Agency email dated 10 October 2024, itself forwarding an email of 8 October 2024 from a third party to the Housing Agency.
• Record 34 is an email dated 10 October 2024 from a third party to the Housing Agency.
In its initial decision the Housing Agency relied on sections 29(1) and 30(1) to refuse access to records 7, 21, 22, 23 and 25, and on section 37(1) to refuse access to record 33 and 34. As outlined above, while in its internal review decision it upheld its decision to refuse access to each of the records, it relied on section 32(1)(b) as the basis to do so. It is no longer relying on sections 29(1) and 30(1) and so I do not need to address these provisions in my decision. While section 37(1) is a mandatory provision, the applicant has confirmed that she does not seek third party personal information and so I need not consider this provision either.
Section 32(1)(b) provides for the refusal of a request where the FOI body considers that access to the record sought could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of any person.
Section 32(1)(b) is not a commonly used exemption. As a general point, this Office takes the view that the exemption should not be applied without careful consideration having been given as to whether the expectation set out in the subsection is a reasonable one in all the circumstances. It should only be invoked in circumstances of the most serious nature. An assessment of the expected consequences of releasing particular records in terms of endangering life or safety is required. It is not necessary, or indeed possible, to establish that such harm will occur but there must be a reasonable expectation of such harm arising.
In its submissions, the Housing Agency said that, in applying exemption 32(1)(b), it had taken into consideration the broad the environment in which its staff and consultants were operating. The Housing Agency noted that the defective blocks crisis is a sensitive and emotive issue, and stated that there had been an escalation of threatening and abusive behaviour towards its employees and the consultants it had engaged to undertake the required technical assessments. The Housing Agency gave examples of this behaviour, which included a number of incidents which took place outside an employee’s home, one of which involved an individual loitering and taking photographs outside the employee’s private residence, and which was reported to An Garda Síochána. The Housing Agency also stated that both it and its appointed agents have been subject to continued inappropriate and grossly unsuitable correspondence, which it said has been received both anonymously and directly from applicants under the two remedial schemes. The Housing Agency stated that the receipt of this correspondence had created an unsafe and unreasonable environment for staff and agents. The Housing Agency went on to note that, in some instances, the correspondence has increased following the release of records under FOI. It noted that certain records which have previously been released under FOI appear to have been provided to the press, which had resulted in the publication of public servants’ names in a number of articles.
The Housing Agency stated that, as a direct result of the pattern of behaviour outlined above, one of its agents has been required to amend operational protocols, including restricting which staff members are permitted to undertake functions necessary to discharge obligations under the relevant framework. It said that these changes were implemented solely to safeguard staff wellbeing and to mitigate risks arising from the conduct that had been encountered.
The Housing Agency argued that, based on the above, it holds legitimate and well-founded concerns regarding both the physical and mental well-being of its staff, recognising its fundamental duty of care under the Safety, Health and Welfare Act 2005 towards them. It said that these concerns remain a top priority, as the organisation acknowledges the critical importance of fostering a safe, supportive, and sustainable working environment. Furthermore, the Housing Agency stated that it is acutely aware of the challenges associated with staff retention and the need to ensure that skilled and experienced personnel are in place to resource and support its role under the current scheme. It argued that, in this context, the release of the records at issue could reasonably be expected to lead to further inappropriate correspondence, thereby heightening the risk to staff and agents. The Housing Agency argued that withholding the records was necessary to ensure both the safety of staff and that its statutory functions can continue to be carried out in a safe and secure manner.
In communication with the applicant, she was at pains to completely refute any suggestion that she, personally, was responsible for any behaviour of the kind referred to above. For the avoidance of any doubt, at no point has the suggestion been advanced that the applicant herself has behaved in the manner outlined by the Housing Agency, or that its reliance on section 32(1)(b) is directly linked to any actions of the applicant personally. Rather, it appears me to be the case that the Housing Agency’s arguments relate to a more general pattern of behaviour by members of the public at large, and reflect the fact that disclosure of a record under FOI is deemed equivalent to its publication to the world at large.
I have carefully considered the submissions made by the Housing Agency. As noted above, this particular exemption is not commonly used. The question I must consider is whether the expectation set out by the Housing Agency is a reasonable one in all the circumstances. In order for the exemption to be upheld, it should be possible to clearly link the expectation of serious harm to the content and context of the records. At the outset, I acknowledge that in the current climate the defective blocks crisis is an extremely well-publicised, controversial and emotive issue, and one that tends to engender strongly held views.
However, I must note that I am not entirely satisfied that a number of points made by the Housing Agency in support of its position are viable arguments, in and of themselves, for the withholding of records under section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act. For example, the Housing Agency has noted that records previously released under FOI appear to have been provided to the press, and that the names of public servants have been published in the media as a result. However, the FOI Act generally envisages the release of the names of staff members of FOI bodies where they appear in relevant records in the context of the performance of their official functions. For example, the names of staff members are generally not considered to be personal information by virtue of the exception to the definition of such information in section 2 of the FOI Act. This Office considers that the exclusion is intended to ensure that section 37 (relating to the personal information of individuals other than the requester) will not be used to exempt from release the identity of a staff member while carrying out his or her official functions. Moreover, as noted above, the FOI Act places no restrictions on the uses to which information released under FOI can subsequently be put. It is therefore entirely legitimate from an FOI perspective for information released under FOI to be used as the basis for media coverage of particular issues – indeed, such use is of obvious importance in helping to ensure transparency and accountability in public bodies, which is wholly in keeping with the broad aims of the FOI Act (this is not to say that other provisions of the FOI Act cannot apply to exempt information relating to its staff, consultants and employees of related agencies, and I address this point further below).
Similarly, the Housing Agency has referenced “inappropriate and grossly unsuitable” communications that it has received, both anonymously and directly from applicants under the relevant schemes. I have absolutely no doubt that such correspondence is extremely unpleasant and upsetting for any staff members to receive, and I fully acknowledge that no employee of any organisation should be subjected to such material in the course of their work. However, it seems to me that conduct which may well be described as “inappropriate and grossly unsuitable” falls some way short of constituting behaviour that might give rise to concerns for the life or safety of an individual. As noted above, the position of this Office is that section 32(1)(b) should only be cited in the in circumstances of the most serious nature. It is not clear to me – and nor has the Housing Agency argued – that the communications it refers to contain, for example, explicit or implied threats against any individuals. To my mind, there is a dividing line between communications that might well be considered “inappropriate and grossly unsuitable” (by reason of, for example, foul language or explicit content) and those which might constitute (for instance) threats against or intimidation of a person. As a general proposition, I can envisage a scenario in which the latter category of communications might (depending on the wider context and specific circumstances) potentially serve to ground an argument for the withholding of records under section 32(1)(b). I am not satisfied that this is the case for the former, albeit that such correspondence is undoubtedly entirely unacceptable and extremely distressing to the recipient.
By the same token, the Housing Agency referred to the importance generally of the well-being of its staff and its fundamental duty of care to employees under health and safety legislation, as well as the importance of fostering a safe, supportive, and sustainable working environment. It also highlighted the challenges associated with staff retention. The argument of the Housing Agency here appears to be that the current climate in relation to the defective blocks crisis will adversely affect its ability to perform its functions and fulfil its obligations in relation to these matters. Again, I am in no doubt at all that the Housing Agency might face significant challenges in these areas, and it may well be the case that these challenges manifest themselves in – for example – difficulties in retaining staff. However, again it must be noted that section 32(1)(b) should only be invoked in the most serious of circumstances . I find it difficult to accept that difficulties the Housing Agency may be experiencing in terms of obligations to its staff generally, under health and safety legislation, as well as its duty to foster a safe and supportive working environment, constitute sufficient grounds to exempt records from release under section 32(1)(b). I take the same view regarding any difficulties the Housing Agency may face in terms of staff retention which, in any case, seem to me to be challenges that are to a greater or lesser extent perennial in any organisation, albeit that they may well be significantly exacerbated for the Housing Agency by the current conditions.
In relation to the above arguments of the Housing Agency, it seems to me that it is essentially making a class-based argument – in other words, that all records (or at least these records) should be withheld because they relate to an issue that is controversial and emotive for those involved. However, this is insufficient to ground a claim for exemption under section 32(1)(b), which must be predicated on the contents of the records and the relevant harms that might reasonably be expected to result from their release.
This being said, I find certain other arguments made by the Housing Agency under section 32(1)(b) to be more convincing. In particular, it has referenced certain incidents when unknown individuals have attended at the home of a Housing Agency employee, which on one occasion necessitated the making of a report to An Garda Síochána. It seems clear to me that such incidents are of the utmost seriousness, the gravity of which moreover far exceeds the other factors that the Housing Agency outlined in support of its position. As noted above, in claiming section 32(1)(b) it is not necessary, or indeed possible, for an FOI body to establish that relevant harm will occur. What I must consider is whether the Housing Agency has shown that there is a reasonable expectation of this. I fully accept that, in the context of the defective blocks crisis, the Housing Agency’s expectation – that the life or safety of an employee may be endangered by individuals attending at their home – is reasonable.
The matter does not end there, however, because in order for a record to be exempt from release under section 32(1)(b), the expectation of the relevant harms that I have accepted is reasonable must be tied to the contents of that record, as well as the context in which it was created. I have outlined above the context in which the records were created. It remains for me to examine whether the specific contents of the records at issue are such that, in that context, their release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life and safety of a person.
In relation to record 7, as outlined above I am only required to examine the part of the record that relates to the applicant’s property. This consists of one line of text comprising the applicant’s address, including county and Eircode, and a brief comment by an unnamed Housing Agency official, which (while making use of certain abbreviations and technical terms) appears to relate to the manner in which the damage to the applicant’s property might be addressed. This seems to me to comprise information which is essentially quite basic. It does not go into any significant detail in relation to the applications under the current scheme or its predecessor that were made by the applicant and does not contain information that, for example, identifies the relevant decision makers in the Housing Agency or other personnel who may be endangered. I find it very difficult to accept that the release of this quite straightforward information could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of any person. I find that the within-scope information in this record is not exempt from release under section 32(1)(b).
In respect of the engineering report which, in various forms of completion, comprises records 21, 22, 23 and 25, I find as follows. I would first of all note again that, in correspondence with this Office in the course of this review, the applicant confirmed that she was not seeking the personal information of third parties and that any such information could be excluded from the scope of the review. As noted above, generally speaking the names of staff members of FOI bodies, where same appears in records in connection with the employee’s performance of their official functions, is considered not to constitute personal information, by virtue of the exclusion from the definition of personal information provided for in paragraph I of section 2 of the FOI Act. It should be noted that paragraph II of section 2 provides for a similar exclusion in the case of service providers to FOI bodies. I note in this regard that the engineering report at issue was created by a service provider (an engineering firm) to the Housing Agency. However, this Office has also held (for example in case OIC-92748) that the exclusion from the definition of personal information does not extend to the to the names of staff members of service providers. In other words, while the exclusion from the definition of personal information applies to the name of service providers themselves, it does not apply to individual employee names within service providers.
Applying this reasoning, I consider that the name of the engineering firm (a company name) which provided the report is excluded from the definition of personal information and thus falls to be considered for release. It should be noted that, while the name of the company incorporates the names of individuals, the High Court has accepted that this is not personal information for the purposes of section 2 of the FOI Act. Specifically, in the case of High Court case of Industrial Development Agency (Ireland) v The Information Commissioner [2024] IEHC 649, Phelan J. stated as follows:
“I am satisfied that s. 37 read together with s. 2 does not preclude disclosure of a company name…simply because the company name is the same as an individual's… Furthermore, even if information was considered to constitute personal information within the meaning of s. 37(1) by disclosing the identity of a natural person as opposed to a company, the fact that the information is publicly available triggers the operation of s. 37(2) to permit disclosure of the information in question. I do not read ss. 2 and 37 of the 2014 Act as precluding the disclosure of information already in the public domain and a matter of public record”.
However, I make a different finding in relation to the name of the individual engineer who prepared the report, and also of the engineer who reviewed and approved it. I find that this is personal information and, in line with the applicant’s agreement to exclude such information from the scope of this review, does not fall to be released. I make the same finding in relation to other personal information relating to the individual engineers that appears in the records, for example the Engineers Ireland membership number that appears at page 9 of record 21.
By the same token, I find that the information relating to a number of other contractors who contributed to an earlier engineering report, which is included at Appendix A of the report at issue, is personal and can be similarly excluded from the scope of this review. Specifically, I make this finding in relation to names, addresses, email addresses, signatures, job titles, and telephone numbers of individual staff members of contractors which appear at the following pages of records 23 and 25:
• page 16 under the heading “The Parties Involved In This Assessment”
• point 2.1 of page 17 and point 2.8 of page 18
• the name of an individual that appears at page 24 after the words “In discussion with…”
• point 2.1 of page 35
• point 2.8 of page 37
• pages 107, 119, 121, 123, 133, 149, 151, 159, 176, 178, 185 and 186.
Similarly, the photographic image of individuals that appear in Photo 4 at page 43, Photo 19 at page 50, Photo 29 at page 55 and Photo 34 at page 58 of records 23 and 25 also comprise the personal information of those individuals and can be excluded from the scope of this review. It is also the case that the co-owner of the applicant’s property is named at points throughout records 21, 22, 23 and 25 and, although this individual is very likely known to the applicant, their name is similarly third-party personal information and can be excluded from the scope of this review.
I note that record 22 consists of the report in draft form, with comments made by Housing Agency staff members appended. In the first instance, given the exclusion from the definition of personal information that applies to the names of staff members of FOI bodies in the course of the performance of their official functions, I am satisfied that the names of the staff members who have made comments on the report do not comprise their personal information. However, I am also cognisant that, as outlined above, while this information may not comprise personal information for the purposes of the FOI Act, this does not mean that other provisions of the legislation cannot operate to exempt it from release. In the case at hand, and given the current climate and the circumstances outlined by the Housing Agency, in particular in relation to individuals attending at the home of a staff member, I consider that it is reasonable to suggest that that the release of the names of staff members as they appear in record 22 could endanger the life or safety of those employees. I therefore find that, in the circumstances, the names of Housing Agency staff members who have made comments on the draft engineering report that comprises record 22 is information that comes within the scope of section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
Furthermore, in relation to the name of the engineering firm that created the report that I have found above not to be personal information, I consider that it is not unreasonable to suggest that the firm might feasibly be targeted by similar incidents as that which occurred when individuals attended at the home of a Housing Agency. It follows that it is reasonable to suggest that the release of this information might be expected to endanger the life or safety of a person. On that basis, I am satisfied that in the circumstances the name and identifying details (eg. postal address, web address, telephone and fax number and email address) of the engineering firm comes within the scope of section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act. On the same basis, I find that the same identifying details of a number of separate contracting firms which appear throughout records 21, 22, 23, and 25 also come within the scope of section 32(1)(b). I would note that it appears likely that the applicant, as well as certain other interested parties with knowledge of the defective blocks crisis, may already be aware of some of the details that I have found to come within the scope of section 32(1)(b). However, as outlined above, the release of information under FOI is not considered to be release to any one individual and I must regard it as release effectively (or at least potentially) to the world at large.
In relation to the remaining information in the engineering report – namely, the substantive contents of the report itself, and the contents of the comments made to the draft version of the report that comprises record 22, I find as follows. In terms of the substantive content of the report, it seems clear to me that this comprises the professional findings of an engineer regarding the extent to which the applicant’s property is affected by defective concrete blocks. From background information provided to me by the applicant, I understand that there may be some question of differing findings between this report and one which issued at an earlier date. However, the contents of the report are simply the professional opinions and findings of the engineer. I cannot envisage any manner in which the release of the substantive contents of the report might reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of a person. Similarly, the comments appended to record 22 seem to me to be relatively straightforward, routine observations. With the exception of the information that I have specified above that can either be withheld on the basis that it is third-party personal information (which the applicant has confirmed can be excluded), or that it is information that comes within the scope of section 32(1)(b), I find that the remaining information in the reports comprising records 21, 22, 23 and 25 is not exempt from release under section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
In relation to records 33 and 34, based on the same reasoning as I have outlined above, I find that the names and email addresses of individuals that appear in these email communications can be withheld from release. There is nothing that I can ascertain in the substantive contents of the emails, which seem to me to comprise relatively routine correspondence related to the processing of the applications submitted under the relevant schemes by the applicant, that I consider could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of a person. I therefore find that the substantive contents of the emails that make up records 33 and 34 are not exempt from release under section 32(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
In relation to the material in the records that I have found to come within the scope of section 32(1)(b) I note that, under section 32(3), subsection (b) of section 32(1) does not apply to a record in certain limited circumstances and where the body considers that the public interest would, on balance, be better served by granting the request. I am satisfied that none of the limited circumstances arise in this case. I find, therefore, that the Housing Agency was justified in refusing the information concerned under section 32(1)(b).
For the avoidance of doubt, the above finding does not preclude this Office from arriving at a different conclusion in respect of similar arguments advanced in future reviews. Each case will be considered on its merits based on the particular facts and circumstances.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby vary the decision of the Housing Agency. I find that the material in the records that I have identified above as third party-personal information is outside the scope of this review, by agreement of the applicant, and can be redacted from the records. I further find that the information I have identified above in the records as coming within the scope of section 32(1)(b) is exempt from release under that provision of the FOI Act. I find that that the remaining information in the records is not so exempt, and I direct its release.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated by the requester not later than eight weeks after notice of the decision was given, and by any other party not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given.
Neill Dougan
Investigator