Decision
Mr X and Irish Prison Service
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-161977-H0G4S7
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-161977-H0G4S7
Published on
Whether the IPS was justified in refusing access to records relating to the applicant’s complaints about various prison personnel
24 November 2025
This review arises from my decision of 27 June 2025 in Case No. OIC-149192-T4Y5J4, which concerned parts of the applicant’s FOI request to the IPS of 9 February 2024. The applicant’s request sought access to various records relating to his detention in two named prisons.
In particular, part 6 of the request sought access to all records concerning investigations into and decisions on the applicant’s complaints. My decision explained why I considered part 6 to encompass records relating to the applicant’s Category A complaints rather than records relating to any non-Category A complaints that he may have made. However, I was not satisfied that the IPS’s decisions had properly dealt with the matter. I directed it to consider the entirety of the Category A investigative records (which the IPS had said included preserved CCTV footage) and the related investigation reports/decisions, and to make a fresh decision on the matter in accordance with the provisions of the FOI Act.
My review also considered section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act (reasonable searches). While largely affirming the IPS’s the application of this provision, I directed it to conduct/conclude its then ongoing review of the applicant’s paper file, to take appropriate steps to search for any misfiled hard copy or electronic records of relevance to the request, and to make a fresh decision on these matters in accordance with the provisions of the FOI Act.
The IPS subsequently issued two decisions to the applicant, both dated 5 August 2025. One decision concerned the Category A complaints records. This decision refused access to various Governor’s Findings records under section 15(1)(i) of the FOI Act (records already released), and to the remainder under various other FOI provisions including section 37(1) (personal information). The second decision said that the IPS had carried out a review for misfiled records. It said that it was satisfied that all records that exist were considered under a previous FOI request, and that it had identified no misfiled records in its review.
On 8 August 2025, the applicant sought an internal review of the IPS’s decision on the Category A complaint records. The IPS’s internal review decision of 29 August 2025 affirmed its refusal of access to the records concerned.
On 1 September 2025, the applicant sought a review by this Office in relation to the IPS’s internal review decision. He contends also that the IPS has not fully complied with my decision of 27 June 2025. He wants me to direct the IPS to comply with my decision and to take particular steps regarding his complaints.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act and I have decided to conclude it by way of a formal, binding decision. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the above exchanges, correspondence between this Office, the IPS and the applicant, copies of the records supplied to this Office by the IPS and the provisions of the FOI Act.
As the applicant is aware, the scope of this review is confined to whether the IPS’s refusal of access to the Category A investigation records was justified under the FOI Act. However, he wants the review to include many other issues, which I address below.
Compliance with decision in Case No. OIC-149192-T4Y5J4
The applicant says that the IPS has not examined his paper file and appears to believe that I directed the IPS to grant access to the Category A investigation records.
As noted above, one of the IPS’s decisions deals specifically with the Category A investigation records, while the second refers only to my direction to search for misfiled records. I asked the IPS for an explanation. As I informed the applicant, the IPS says that its second decision covered the examination of the paper file even though it does not specifically refer to the matter. I provided the applicant with various details given to me by the IPS in this regard, and outlined its position that no further relevant records had been found, either by searching for misfiled records or in the review of his paper file. I told the applicant that, in the circumstances, I considered my June decision to have been fully complied with, and that I would not be pursuing the matter further.
The applicant appears to believe that I directed the IPS to grant access to the Category A investigation records. However, as I explained to him on 7 July and 15 October 2025, I did not make such a direction. Rather, I directed the IPS to make a fresh decision on the matter. As I have also explained to the applicant, in making that fresh decision it was open to the IPS to refuse access to some or all of the records concerned.
I have explained to the applicant that my review cannot examine the IPS’s position on the matters of his paper file and its searches for misfiled records. The applicant’s internal review application specifically concerned the IPS’s decision on the Category A investigation records. It did not seek any review of the IPS’s second decision and therefore the matters it concerns have not been through the internal review process.
However, I have informed the applicant of his right to submit a late application for internal review to the IPS. He is also aware that the IPS has discretion to accept a late application, where the requester gives reasonable grounds.
The records at issue relate to the IPS’s investigations of seven Category A complaints made by the applicant. However, the applicant says the IPS should have investigated other Category A complaints that he made. He asks me to direct the IPS to provide him with clear, individual responses to each of his Category A complaints. As I understand it, he also wants me to provide a letter that he could use to pursue a legal claim, with a view to obtaining findings from the IPS on the other Category A complaints along with any relevant decisions or records from the Inspector of Prisons.
In addition, the applicant wants me to direct the IPS to provide him with signed copies of the Governors’ Findings. Essentially, such records summarise the findings arising from the investigation of a complaint and set out the Governor’s ensuing decision and actions. The Governors’ Findings that were provided to the applicant by the IPS were unsigned. The applicant says also that this Office should obtain such records directly from the IPS, review the findings, and verify whether the IPS handled his complaints properly.
However, as I explained to the applicant on 27 May and 17 November 2025, it is not the case that the IPS redacted the Governor’s Findings when providing them to him. Its position is that the records are, in their own right, unsigned and that, in fact, it has fully released the records concerned. As the applicant is aware, I have no role in relation to records that have been fully released.
I have also explained to the applicant that the FOI Act does not give me remit to seek or direct the IPS to provide signed copies of Governors’ Findings or any other document, or to examine the other matters he raises, including the IPS’s handling of his complaints or any other aspect of the IPS’s performance of its functions generally. My review cannot take account of his views on such issues.
The applicant contends that the IPS is using the FOI process to avoid exposing wrongdoing by its staff. He says that the records should be released to ensure that prisoners and their families can have confidence that there are consequences for wrongdoing, in line with EU law and basic human rights principles. I am aware from my previous review that the applicant wants to obtain the records to prove certain issues.
However, section 13(4) of the FOI Act provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a request, any reason that a requester gives for the request shall be disregarded. This means that in this case, I cannot have regard to the applicant’s motives for making his request, except in so far as those motives reflect what might be regarded as public interest factors in favour of release of the information where the Act requires a consideration of the public interest.
Section 18(1) of the FOI Act provides, that "if it is practicable to do so", access to an otherwise exempt record shall be granted by preparing a copy, in such form as the head of the public body concerned considers appropriate, of the record with the exempt information removed. Section 18(1) does not apply, however, if the copy provided for thereby would be misleading (section 18(2) refers). Furthermore, the Commissioner takes the view that, generally, neither the definition of a record nor the provisions of section 18 envisage or require the extracting of particular sentences or occasional paragraphs from the remainder of such records for the purpose of granting access to those particular sentences or paragraphs. Generally speaking, therefore, this Office is not in favour of the cutting or "dissecting" of records to such an extent. Being practicable necessarily means taking a reasonable and proportionate approach in determining whether to grant access to parts of records.
Section 25(3) of the FOI Act requires me to take all reasonable precautions in the performance of my functions to prevent the disclosure of information contained in an exempt record or that would cause the record to be exempt if it contained that information.
Release of records under FOI is generally understood to have the same effect as publishing them to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which the information contained in those records may be put.
Section 15(1)(i) of the FOI Act provides for the refusal to grant a request where the request relates to records already released, either to the same or a previous requester, and where the records are available to the requester concerned.
The IPS has refused access to the Governor’s Findings under this provision. It says that it has already forwarded the records to the applicant in accordance with the relevant Prison Rules, and that it also released them in its initial decision making on his FOI request.
As I informed the applicant, the Category A investigation records include evidence considered by the investigator, such as some of the applicant’s records that I understand the investigator obtained from the Prison Healthcare Management System (PHMS) and Prisoner Information Management System (PIMS). I told the applicant that I considered section 15(1)(i) to apply to such records, in light of the IPS’s position that they have already been released to him from his files. I referred him also to my decision in Case No. 149192, where I found that the IPS had taken reasonable steps to search for records relating to the applicant as held on the PHMS and PIMS (other than for searches for misfiled records and the examination of his hard copy file, as mentioned earlier).
The only comments that the applicant has made in relation to my consideration of section 15(1)(i) is that he should be provided with signed copies of the Governor’s Findings. As set out earlier, however, the FOI Act gives me no powers to seek or direct the IPS to take such steps.
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Governor’s Findings and the above-mentioned investigative records have been released to the applicant and are available to him. I find that the IPS was justified in refusing access to these records under section 15(1)(i) of the FOI Act.
Section 37(1), subject to other provisions of section 37, requires the refusal of a request if access to the record concerned would involve the disclosure of personal information (including personal information relating to a deceased individual).
Section 2 of the FOI Act defines personal information as information about an identifiable individual that (a) would ordinarily be known only to the individual or members of the family, or friends, of the individual, or (b) is held by a public body on the understanding that it would be treated by it as confidential. Section 2 also lists 14 non-exhaustive examples of what must be considered to be personal information, including (i) information relating to the medical history of the individual, (iii) information relating to the employment or employment history of the individual, (vi) information relating to any criminal history of, or the commission of or alleged commission of any offence by, the individual, and (xiv) the views or opinions of another person about the individual. Where information is captured by one or more of these 14 examples, there is no need for the requirements at (a) or (b) of the definition to also be met.
Section 2 of the FOI Act excludes certain information from being considered as personal information. Where the individual holds or held a position as a member of the staff of an FOI body, personal information does not include his or her name, or information relating to the position, the functions of the position, the terms upon and subject to which the individual holds or held that position, or anything written or recorded in any form by the individual in the course of and for the purpose of the performance of his or her functions (Paragraph I refers).
However, the exclusions do not cover all information relating to public servants. This Office considers that the exclusions are intended, in essence, to ensure that section 37 cannot be used to exempt the identity of a public servant in the context of the particular position held, or any records created by the relevant person while carrying out his or her official functions, or information relating to the terms, conditions and functions of positions. The exclusions do not deprive public servants of the right to privacy generally.
The applicant says that he is a victim of abuse, and believes that he has a right to see the information relating to the relevant IPS personnel. He says that it is not “a matter of mere personnel data: it relates to alleged criminal abuse, an issue of public accountability.” He says also that Regulations have been made under the FOI Act that, in certain cases, permit the release of personal information despite the section 37 exemption.
The IPS says that Category A complaints are complaints alleging assault or use of excessive force against a prisoner, or ill treatment, racial abuse, discrimination, intimidation, threats or any other conduct against a prisoner of a nature and gravity likely to bring discredit on the IPS. It says that the records contain unsubstantiated allegations against staff, the release of which would have reputational and other impacts on the parties concerned. Its position is that the requested records contain the personal information of IPS staff and other identifiable individuals.
Having examined the records supplied by the IPS to this Office, I am satisfied that all of them, including the preserved CCTV, relate to the applicant’s Category A complaints about the alleged actions of various prison personnel. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that all of the withheld records can be said to contain information relating to the employment or employment history of various individuals other than the applicant, and the views or opinions of other persons about the individuals concerned. The records also relate to the applicant’s imprisonment and in some cases his medical history, and also contain the views or opinions of other persons about him. In addition, I note that some of the records refer to and concern identifiable individuals other than the applicant or prison personnel.
Having regard to the above, I am satisfied that the records, in their entirety, contain personal information about various parties, including the applicant, for the purposes of section 2 of the FOI Act. As noted, however, section 2 also sets out very limited exceptions where information relating to public servants cannot be considered as their personal information. The applicant may argue that this means the records cannot be considered to contain personal information relating to the relevant prison personnel, because the records concern their conduct in carrying out their official duties.
All of the records at issue were created in the context of the applicant’s allegations of very serious wrongdoing by various prison personnel, which the investigations found to be unsubstantiated. In any event, even if a public servant had been involved in misconduct in the course of their work, I do not accept that any such misconduct could be characterised as being for the purpose of the performance of the public servant’s functions. While misconduct may sometimes occur while at work, and indeed may be facilitated by virtue of the work position held by an individual, it cannot be said to be something done for the purposes of performing one's work functions. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that none of the qualifications on the definition of personal information cited above apply to the records at issue in this case.
The applicant queries why, at the very least, he cannot get portions of the records. It should be borne in mind that I have not yet considered the IPS’s other claims for exemption for the records, which include a provision intended to prevent harm to the security of a penal institution. Nonetheless, I have considered whether it is possible to direct the release of the records subject to the redaction of third-party names and other identifying details, and in the case of CCTV, by the IPS pixilating the footage. However, given their content and context, I am satisfied that it is not appropriate or practicable to grant partial access to the written records further to the provisions of section 18 of the FOI Act. Furthermore, even apart from the context in which the preserved CCTV footage must be considered, as the applicant is aware the IPS says that it does not have software that allows the pixilation of such images. Accordingly, and aside from whether other provisions of the FOI Act apply, I do not consider it possible to direct the partial release of the records.
In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the records contain personal information relating to the applicant that is inextricably linked to personal information relating to other identifiable individuals (joint personal information). The applicant may argue that he is entitled to joint personal information. However, the provisions of section 37(7) of the FOI Act are relevant. Section 37(7) provides that, notwithstanding section 37(2)(a) (see below), access to a record shall be refused where access to it would, in addition to involving the disclosure of personal information relating to the requester, also involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual or individuals other than the requester.
Further to the above, I am satisfied that granting access to the details at issue would involve the disclosure of third-party personal information. I find that section 37(1) of the FOI Act applies. It is also important to note that it is not relevant that some of the records at issue were created by the applicant.
I note here the applicant’s view that the Regulations made under section 37(8) of the FOI Act may be relevant. However, such Regulations provide for the potential release of records relating to minors, incapacitated persons and deceased persons to certain classes of requester. I am satisfied that the section 37(8) Regulations have no relevance in the circumstances of this case.
I will now consider sections 37(2) and (5) of the FOI Act.
Section 37(2) of the FOI Act sets out certain circumstances in which 37(1) does not apply. In particular, section 37(2)(a) provides that section 37(1) does not apply if the information concerned relates to the requester concerned.
The applicant has not made any arguments that appear relevant to section 37(2). However, he may argue that section 37(2)(a) applies on the basis that the records include his personal information. I have explained that the applicant’s personal information is inextricably linked to personal information relating to third parties, and that section 37(7) applies. I find that the details do not fall to be released under section 37(2)(a) of the FOI Act.
I am satisfied that none of the other circumstances set out in section 37(2) apply in this case.
Section 37(5) of the FOI Act provides that a request that would fall to be refused under section 37(1) may still be granted where, on balance, (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates, or (b) the grant of the information would be to the benefit of the person to whom the information relates. I am satisfied that the release of the information at issue would not be to the benefit of the relevant third parties and that section 37(5)(b) does not apply.
Before I consider the applicability of section 37(5)(a), there are a number of important points to note. First, section 13(4) provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. In relation to the question of the public interest, this means that I cannot have regard to the applicant's motives for seeking access to the records at issue, except in so far as those motives reflect, or overlap with, what might be regarded as true public interest factors in favour of release of the records, i.e. insofar as the concerns raised in relation to the request may also be matters of general concern to the wider public.
Secondly, it is important to note that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under the Act can be put. With certain limited exceptions provided for under the Act, such as under section 37(8) which I have already noted are not relevant in this case, FOI is not about granting access to information to particular individuals only. In addition, as also noted above, a requester's reasons for making a request are generally not of relevance. Thus, records are not released under FOI for any limited or restricted purpose. All of this means that in considering whether a right of access exists to records under section 37(5)(a) of the Act, any decision to grant access would be on the basis that there is an overriding public interest in the release of the records effectively to the world at large that outweighs the privacy rights of the third-party individuals concerned.
It is also important to note that the FOI Act recognises the public interest in the protection of the right to privacy both in the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the Act (which makes clear that the release of records under FOI must be consistent with the right to privacy). It is also worth noting that the right to privacy has a constitutional dimension, as one of the unenumerated personal rights under the Constitution. Moreover, unlike other public interest tests provided for in the FOI Act, there is a discretionary element to section 37(5)(a), which is a further indication of the very strong public interest in the right to privacy. Privacy rights will therefore be set aside only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) is sufficiently strong to outweigh the public interest in protecting privacy.
In considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I have had regard to section 11(3) of the Act which provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and to promote adherence by them to the principles of transparency in government and public affairs and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies. However, in doing so, I have also had regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57 (“the Enet judgment”). In that case, the Supreme Court found that a general principle of openness does not suffice to direct release of records in the public interest and “there must be a sufficiently specific, cogent and fact-based reason to tip the balance in favour of disclosure”. Although the Court’s comments were made in cases involving confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, I consider them to be relevant to the consideration of public interest tests generally.
As noted below, the applicant also refers to the Information Commissioner’s Guidance Note on section 37, specifically in relation to considering the public interest. I have had regard to the details therein.
The applicant has previously said that the only way he can prove certain issues is by obtaining the records at issue. In this case, he contends that the IPS is using the FOI process to avoid exposing wrongdoing by its staff. He says that the records should be released to ensure that prisoners and their families can have confidence that there are consequences for wrongdoing, in line with EU law and basic human rights principles. He says that he has rights under the Constitution to transparency and accountability. He says that the IPS has obstructed the disclosure of his records, despite his own efforts and those of organisations like the Law Society, etc.
The applicant says that he is a victim of abuse. In essence, he says that there is a very strong public interest in transparency about the alleged perpetrators, the IPS’s examination of such serious matters, the outcomes of its investigations and in accountability. He says he believes that he has a right to see the information relating to the relevant IPS staff, which he says is not “a matter of mere personnel data: it relates to alleged criminal abuse, an issue of public accountability.” He says that IPS personnel should not have blanket privacy rights in circumstances of alleged abuse, and that the usual privacy concerns are outweighed in this case by the public interest in his safety and in institutional accountability. He also refers generally to this Office’s guidance on how section 37 should be interpreted, including how to weigh the competing public interests. He believes that he has a right to pursue information about those who may have harmed him.
The applicant also says that the Irish public and taxpayers deserve to see how public funds are used by the IPS, particularly when serious abuse is alleged. He says that the possibility that IPS personnel abused a prisoner, and that this might not be fully transparent or properly investigated, raises profound public concern. He says that the public interest must not serve as a shield for wrongdoing, especially when public servants may have acted in ways that cost public trust and public money. He also refers to the need to ensure that this Office has accurate, credible and complete information, such as the signed Governor’s Findings.
The IPS’s original decision acknowledges that there is a public interest in members of the public knowing how an FOI body performs its functions; in knowing that information held by FOI bodies about them is accurate; and in members of the public exercising their rights under FOI. It also notes the public interest in protecting privacy rights. I also note from its submission that it says the records contain unsubstantiated allegations about prison personnel, the disclosure of which may have reputational and other consequences for the parties concerned.
As I have indicated above, section 11(3) of the Act provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies.
I note the IPS’s position that there is a public interest in members of the public exercising their rights under FOI. I have already referred to the comments of the Supreme Court in the eNet judgment regarding the public interest. I also note that while section 11(1) of the FOI Act provides for the right of access to records, section 11(7) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as applying the right of access to an exempt record (a) where the exemption is mandatory, or (b) where the exemption operates by virtue of the exercise of a discretion that requires the weighing of the public interest, if the factors in favour of refusal outweigh those in favour of release.” Overall, it seems to me that the FOI Act itself reflects a public interest in protecting exempt information from being disclosed to the world at large. In my view, there would have to be something more than any general public interest that may be reflected in the right of access in order to tip the balance in favour of disclosure of the records at issue in this case.
The IPS says that there is a public interest in individuals knowing that information held by FOI bodies about them is accurate. I note that section 9 of the FOI Act provides for the potential amendment of records where the requester’s personal information is incomplete, etc. However, I do not believe that it is appropriate for me to direct the release of joint or third-party personal information to the world at large in the public interest, so that the applicant may assess the accuracy etc. of his personal information.
I have also explained that I can only take account of the applicant’s motives for making his request, or his private interests in obtaining the requested information, insofar as they reflect what might be regarded as public interest factors in favour of release of the personal information at issue. Essentially, he can be taken as arguing that the public interest requires the disclosure of the records in order to promote transparency and accountability regarding the investigations into, and decisions made on, his Category A complaints, and that disclosure will enable his assessment of the accuracy of his personal information therein. He also appears to argue that disclosure of the records will enhance transparency in relation to expenditure of public monies. However, I do not consider the applicant’s view regarding the need for this Office to obtain records such as signed Governors’ Findings as a valid public interest argument and I will not refer further to this matter.
The applicant is dissatisfied with the IPS’s handling of his complaints and other matters. In circumstances where the records at issue have been fully withheld, I am satisfied that their disclosure will provide considerable transparency in relation to the IPS’s performance of its functions, particularly regarding its administration of the applicant’s complaints about his care and safety, and enable the pursuit of any accountability that may be necessary. It will also enable the applicant to assess the accuracy of his personal information as contained therein. I am satisfied that there is a heavy weight to the public interest in openness and accountability in relation to how the IPS has performed its functions in relation to the applicant.
However, this does not mean that it is within this Office’s remit to determine or to make value judgments as to whether the applicant should have been provided with the details at issue in the course of the investigations of his complaints. It also does not permit me to review the question of whether the outcomes of the investigations were correct or not. In other words, it is not open to me to determine that the details at issue should be provided to the applicant now, in the public interest under section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act, as a means of remedying any suspected or actual failure by the IPS to properly examine his complaints or as a means of remedying any other issue. It seems to me that the question of whether the applicant should have access to the details at issue in order to pursue a remedy or some other form of redress is a matter for the Courts, which have been given exclusive power under the Constitution for the administration of justice. As outlined earlier, disclosure of records under FOI is generally understood to have the same effect as publishing them to the world at large. By contrast, where records are provided further to a court order for discovery, they are provided subject to an undertaking that they are to be utilised solely for the purposes of the legal proceedings in question and that no further use or passing on is allowed.
The applicant appears to argue that because the records concern a publicly funded body’s performance of its functions, their disclosure will provide an insight into the IPS’s expenditure and/or management of monies. However, having regard to the nature and content of the records, I do not accept that their disclosure will provide any insight into such matters. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is no weight to the public interest in disclosure of the records on the basis that this would provide transparency regarding the IPS’s expenditure and/or management of public monies.
I will now consider the weight to attach to the public interest in protecting privacy rights regarding the information at issue. It is important to say here that the FOI Act is concerned with enhancing the transparency of FOI bodies, and that it does not deprive public servants of the right to privacy generally. Furthermore, as I have already noted, the right to privacy has a constitutional dimension.
The records all relate to the applicant’s Category A complaints against various prison personnel. I note that Category A complaints in general are of a very serious nature. I also note the IPS’s comments about the reputational and other consequences that could arise from disclosure of the details at issue. Having regard to the foregoing, and the particular content of the records, I am satisfied that the personal information of the IPS personnel concerned is intrinsically very sensitive and private. As I have noted, the records also contain personal information relating to other parties, which I am satisfied ranges from what is intrinsically quite sensitive and private to what is intrinsically very sensitive and private. Having regard to the fact that release of records under FOI effectively amounts to their disclosure to the world at large, I am satisfied that there is a very heavy weight to the public interest in protecting against any breaches of third-party privacy rights in this case.
Having considered the matter very carefully, on balance, I do not consider that the public interest in disclosing the records at issue outweighs the public interest in protecting the rights to privacy of the third parties to whom the details relate. I find that the details do not fall to be released further to the provisions of section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act.
In the circumstances, there is no need for me to consider the other provisions of the FOI Act that the IPS relied on in its decisions.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm the IPS’s decision, on the basis that the Category A investigation records are exempt from release under sections 15(1)(i) and 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Anne Lyons
Investigator