Decision
Ms. X & Health Service Executive (HSE)
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-161674-C3S1R5
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: OIC-161674-C3S1R5
Published on
Whether the HSE was justified, under section 37(1) of the FOI Act, in refusing access to information of a third party contained in a birth registration form
28 October 2025
On 26 June 2025, the applicant submitted a request to the HSE for a certified copy of the original birth registration form (Form IRB3) for her child, including the signatures of both parents. On 9 July 2025, the HSE part-granted the applicant’s request, and released a redacted copy of the original birth registration form. The HSE refused information relating to the father of the child contained on the birth registration form under section 37 of the FOI Act on the basis that it is personal information of a third party.
On 21 July 2025, the applicant sought an internal review of the HSE’s decision. On 24 July 2025, the HSE affirmed its original decision. On 20 August 2025, the applicant applied to this Office for a review of the HSE’s decision. In her application, the applicant said she wished to receive an unredacted copy of the child’s birth registration form, with the redaction of only the PPS number of the third party if necessary. The applicant also said she already holds the official birth certificate which contains the same core details (including the father’s identity) and said that there is no legal or privacy basis to withhold the information contained in the birth registration form. She said the original registration, including signatures, is critical in ongoing court proceedings concerning her child.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the correspondence outlined above and to the submissions made by the applicant and the HSE during the course of this review. I have also had regard to the contents of the record concerned. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
This review is solely concerned with whether the HSE was justified, under section 37(1) of the FOI Act, in refusing access to personal information it redacted from the copy of the birth registration form it released to the applicant.
A birth registration form is used to officially record a child’s birth. The form contains details about the mother, the father, and the child. Information on the form includes the name, address, date of birth, PPS number, nationality, and signature of each parent. It also includes the birth surname of each parent’s mother.
As noted above, the HSE refused access to certain information from the birth registration form (Form IRB3) relating to the father of the child on the basis that the withheld information constitutes personal information of a third party.
Section 37(1) provides that an FOI body shall refuse a request if access to the record concerned would involve the disclosure of personal information. The effect of section 37 is that, generally speaking, access to a record or part thereof shall be refused if it would involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual(s) other than the requester. Under section 37(1), personal information cannot be released unless one of the other relevant provisions of section 37 applies.
For the purposes of the Act, personal information is defined as information about an identifiable individual that either (a) would ordinarily be known only to the individual or members of the family, or friends, of the individual, or (b) is held by an FOI body on the understanding that it would be treated by that body as confidential. The Act details fourteen specific categories of information which are included in the definition without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing definition.
In its submissions to this Office, the HSE outlined the grounds on which it considered that section 37(1) of the FOI Act applies to the record. The HSE claim that the information in the record satisfies the definition of personal information as it would, in the ordinary course of events, be known only to the individual or members of the family, or friends, of the individual; in this case the third party’s name, address, Date of birth, PPSN, mother’s birth surname, and the individual’s signature. Additionally, the HSE noted that whilst birth certificates are considered a public record, birth registration forms are not, and as such information contained in a birth registration form is considered to be personal information not intended for release to the world at large.
During correspondence with both the HSE and this Office, the applicant stated that she required an unredacted copy of the birth registration form as proof that the father of the child agreed to the child’s surname, as recorded on the form. The applicant stated that she had no intention of publishing or misusing the record or any of the father’s personal information, but rather that the record would exclusively be submitted to the Court as part of ongoing legal proceedings. Additionally, the applicant stated that she already holds a copy of the official birth certificate which includes the father’s identity, and as such she believed there was no legal or privacy basis to withhold the information redacted from the birth registration form.
For the benefit of the applicant, I should state that the fact that the requester may be aware of the nature of the information withheld does not mean that it cannot be regarded as personal information relating to a third party for the purposes of the FOI Act. It may well be the case that the personal information relating to an individual is known to the requester. In some cases, the requester and the individual may be closely connected. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that the information is personal information.
Having examined the withheld information, I am satisfied that it comprises personal information relating solely to an individual other than the applicant. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the release of the information at issue would involve disclosure of personal information relating to that individual. As such, I find that section 37(1) of the Act applies to the information redacted by the HSE.
However, the matter does not end there, as 37(1) is subject to the other provisions of section 37. Section 37(2) provides that section 37(1) does not apply in certain circumstances. I am satisfied that no such circumstances arise in this case and that section 37(2) does not, therefore, apply.
Section 37(5) provides that a request that would fall to be refused under subsection (1) may still be granted where, on balance, (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the public interest that the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates should be upheld, or (b) the grant of the request would benefit the person to whom the information relates. No argument has been made that the release of the information at issue in this case would benefit the person to whom the information relates, nor is it apparent to me how release would do so. Therefore, I find that section 37(5)(b) does not apply.
Before I consider the applicability of section 37(5)(a), there are a number of important points to note. First, section 13(4) provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. In relation to the question of the public interest, this means that I cannot have regard to the applicant's motives for seeking access to the records at issue, except in so far as those motives reflect, or overlap with, what might be regarded as true public interest factors in favour of release of the records, i.e. insofar as the concerns raised in relation to the request may also be matters of general concern to the wider public.
Secondly, as noted above, it is important to note that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under the Act can be put. With certain limited exceptions provided for under the Act, FOI is not about granting access to information to particular individuals only and as noted above, a requester's reasons for making a request are generally not of relevance. Thus, records are not released under FOI for any limited or restricted purpose.
All of this means that in considering whether a right of access exists to records under section 37(5)(a) of the Act, any decision to grant access would be on the basis that there is an overriding public interest in the release of the records effectively to the world at large that outweighs the privacy rights of the third-party individuals concerned.
In considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I have had regard to section 11(3) of the Act which provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and to promote adherence by them to the principles of transparency in government and public affairs and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies. However, in doing so, I have also had regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57 (“the Enet case”). In that case, the Supreme Court found that a general principle of openness does not suffice to direct release of records in the public interest and “there must be a sufficiently specific, cogent and fact-based reason to tip the balance in favour of disclosure”. Although the Court’s comments were made in cases involving confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, I consider them to be relevant to the consideration of public interest tests generally.
As noted above, in her submissions to this Office the applicant provided a number of detailed arguments in support of her belief that the withheld information should be released. The applicant stated that she believed the threshold of section 37(5)(a) had been met given the legal, emotional, and child welfare issues concerned. Whilst the applicant provided a compelling account of the reasons for her request, the arguments made appear to constitute a private interest as opposed to a true public interest. I acknowledge that there is an inherent public interest in protecting the welfare of a child, however, based on the submissions provided by the applicant, it is not clear to me how release of the information of the kind held in the record requested could be considered to achieve a broader public interest in child welfare. As the applicant noted, she already has a copy of the child’s birth certificate which records the child’s name and the name of his father. It seems to me that the information the applicant is seeking in this case essentially concerns her personal dispute with the child’s father about the child’s surname.
In its submissions to this Office, the HSE stated that it acknowledged the release of the withheld information would support the applicant’s private interest, but did not believe it would satisfy a public interest. It stated that whilst the applicant is aware of some of the withheld information, she does not have access to all of the information. The HSE stated that it had considered a number of public interest factors in favour of release, such as the public interest in the public knowing how a public body performs its functions, the public interest in members of the public knowing that information held by pubic bodies about them, or those they represent, is accurate, and the public interest in members of the public exercising their rights under the FOI Act. Additionally, the HSE stated that it had also considered the public interest factors in favour of withholding the redacted information, namely the public interest in protecting the right to privacy of members of the public, the public interest in members of the public being able to communicate in confidence with public bodies and without fear of disclosure in relation to personal or sensitive matters, the public interest in public bodies being able to perform their functions effectively, and finally the public interest in safeguarding the flow of information to public bodies. The HSE stated that the information requested is personal to the individual and its disclosure would represent an unjustified intrusion into their privacy. It stated that any public interest in access is limited and does not outweigh the strong public interest in upholding the individual’s right to privacy. The HSE noted that the individual concerned did not provide consent to release his personal information. As such, the HSE stated that having considered the factors both in favour and against release, it concluded that the public interest in preserving the privacy of the third parties involved outweighed the public interest that would be served were the information to be released to the requester.
The FOI Act provides a right of access to information in the possession of public bodies to the greatest extent possible consistent with the public interest and the right to privacy. The FOI Act recognises the public interest in the protection of the right to privacy both in the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the Act (which makes clear that the release of records under FOI must be consistent with the right to privacy). It is also worth noting that the right to privacy has a constitutional dimension, as one of the unenumerated personal rights under the Constitution. Privacy rights will therefore be set aside only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) is sufficiently strong to outweigh the public interest in protecting privacy. Moreover, even where an overriding public interest in granting the request exists, there is a discretionary element to the application of section 37(5)(a).
The information at issue in this case concerns personal information about an individual other than the applicant. I accept that there is a public interest in transparency around the registration of births. As noted above, the applicant already has a copy of her child’s birth certificate. However, while certain details recorded on the birth certificate are also recorded on the birth registration form, this does not in my view override the rights of privacy of the individual concerned. While I sympathise with the applicant’s personal circumstances, in my view there is no overriding public interest in releasing the personal information of the other party in this case. I am not satisfied that the public interest is best served by granting access to the information redacted in the record concerned. I find that the protection of the privacy rights of the third party at issue outweighs the public interest in release of the redacted information at issue in this case. I find, therefore, that section 37(5)(a) does not apply.
In conclusion, I find that the HSE was justified in refusing access to the information it redacted from the birth registration form under section 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm the HSE’s decision to refuse access to the information it withheld from the record it released to the applicant under section 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
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Richard Crowley
Investigator