Decision
Mr K and Department of Justice and Equality (the Department)
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: 180517
Published on
From Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)
Case number: 180517
Published on
Whether the Department was justified in refusing the applicant’s request for access to records relating to the former Minister for Justice and Equality, named individuals and a company
15 May 2019
On 21 August 2018, the applicant made a request for access to records of all communications between the former Minister for Justice and Equality, named individuals and a private company between 1 May and 29 May 2015. A similar but not identical request and review application is being dealt with in my decision in case no. 180490. The Department identified two records related to the request and released both. The applicant applied for an internal review and stated that he believed further records may exist and queried whether "all relevant private email addresses and/or messaging services" had been considered by the Department. In its internal review decision the Department identified records which it said were not referenced in its original decision. The Department granted access in part to one additional record with redactions made on the basis of section 37(1) (Personal information) of the FOI Act. On 21 November 2018, this Office received an application for review from the applicant.
In conducting this review I have had regard to the submissions of the Department and to correspondence between the applicant, the Department and this Office. I have also had regard to the provisions of the FOI Act. I consider that the review should now be brought to a close by the issue of a formal, binding decision. The applicant was invited to make submissions but none was received by this Office.
In his application to this Office the applicant stated that "other communications ... [were] not supplied and refused". I take this to mean that the applicant also wishes me to review whether further records covered by his request are held, i.e. a refusal of access on the basis of section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act.
Consequently, this review is solely concerned with whether the decision of the Department to refuse the applicant's request under sections 15(1)(a) and 37(1) of the FOI Act was justified.
Section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act provides that a request for access to a record may be refused if the record does not exist or cannot be found after all reasonable steps to ascertain its whereabouts have been taken. The role of my Office in cases such as this is to review the decision of the FOI body and to decide whether that decision was justified. This means that I must have regard to the evidence available to the decision maker and the reasoning used by the decision maker in arriving at his/her decision and I also must assess the adequacy of the searches conducted by the FOI body in looking for relevant records.
The evidence in "search" cases consists of the steps actually taken to search for records, along with miscellaneous other evidence about the record management practices of the FOI body, on the basis of which the FOI body concluded that the steps taken to search for records were reasonable. Having regard to the information provided, I form a view as to whether the decision maker was justified in coming to the decision that the records sought do not exist or cannot be found. However, it is not normally the function of my Office to search for records that a requester believes are in existence.
As mentioned earlier, the applicant was invited to provide further details that might assist in determining whether further records might be held. However, no other communication was received by this Office from the applicant during this review. Section 12(1)(b) of the Act requires that an FOI request should contain sufficient particulars to enable the record to be identified by the taking of reasonable steps.
In its submission to this Office the Department said that a mailmeter electronic search was conducted for all electronic records between all departmental emails and the company. It said that the search included words associated with names and addresses. The Department also said it conducted searches of mobile devices and messaging apps and Departmental phones of the former Minister and an advisor. It said that the former Minister verified that no relevant records were held on her Departmental phone. It also said that the named special advisor's phone was reset, wiped of data and recirculated when the advisor left the Department in 2017. The Department said that the other named individuals confirmed that they never had contact via phone or messaging service with the company.
The Department said that it has issued a revised notice to its staff on "FOI procedures reminding staff of all relevant records which should be considered and including a template for an updated electronic search facility to include email, databases, applications and files". I note that, while the applicant is of the view that more records may be held by the Department, he has provided no supporting evidence to suggest that other relevant records are held. In light of the above, I do not consider that I would now be justified under section 15(1)(a) in requiring the Department to take further search steps on the basis of the applicant's belief that contacts on Departmental business additional to those already identified may have taken place and that records of these ought to be held.
Having considered the submissions of the Department and the measures it has described in its efforts to locate the records, I am satisfied that the Department has taken all reasonable steps to locate any further records and that section 15(1)(a) of the FOI Act applies.
Section 37(1) of the FOI Act provides for the refusal of a request where access to the record sought would involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual or individuals other than the requester. For the purposes of the Act, personal information is defined as information about an identifiable individual that (a) would, in the ordinary course of events, be known only to the individual or their family or friends or, (b) is held by a public body on the understanding that it would be treated by it as confidential.
While I cannot discuss the content in any detail, I can state that the information withheld contains relatively small pieces of information relating to identifiable individuals other than the applicant. Accordingly, I find that section 37(1) of the Act applies to the record.
There are some further circumstances, provided for at section 37(2), in which the exemption at section 37(1) does not apply. I am satisfied that none of these are relevant in this case.
Section 37(5) of the FOI Act provides that a request that would fall to be refused under section 37(1) may still be granted where, on balance (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates, or (b) the grant of the information would be to the benefit of the person to whom the information relates.
It has not been argued that releasing the records would benefit the individuals to whom the information relates and I am satisfied that section 37(5)(b) does not apply in the circumstances. In relation to paragraph (a), the question I must consider is whether the public interest in granting the request outweighs, on balance, the public interest in protecting the right of privacy of the individuals to whom the information relates.
The FOI Act itself recognises the public interest in ensuring the transparency and accountability of public bodies. On the other hand, however, the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the FOI Act recognise a very strong public interest in protecting the right to privacy, which has a Constitutional dimension, as one of the un-enumerated personal rights under the Constitution. Accordingly, when considering section 37(5)(a), privacy rights will be set aside only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) is sufficiently strong to outweigh the public interest in protecting privacy.
In my view, the public interest in openness and transparency in how the Department dealt with the applicant has been served to some extent by the release of some of the information in records to the applicant. The question I must consider is whether the public interest in further enhancing that transparency and accountability is sufficiently strong to outweigh, on balance, the public interest in protecting the right of privacy of the individuals to whom the information relates. In my view, it is not. In holding that view, I have had regard to the fact that the release of a record on foot of a request made under the FOI Act is, in effect, regarded as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the potential uses to which released records released may be put.
On balance, I do not see how in this case the public interest that access to the records should be granted outweighs the public interest that the right to privacy of the third parties should be upheld. Accordingly, I find that section 37(1) of the Act applies to the withheld information in the records.
Having carried out a review under section 34(2) of the Act, I hereby affirm the Department’s decision. I affirm its decision to refuse access to further records under section 15(1)(a) of the Act on the ground that no further records exist or can be found after all reasonable steps to ascertain their whereabouts have been taken. I affirm its decision to refuse access to the withheld information in the record under section 37(1) on the basis that it contains the personal information of individuals other than the applicant. I find that the public interest in granting the request in relation to the record does not outweigh the public interest in upholding the privacy rights of other individuals.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Elizabeth Dolan
Senior Investigator