Cinneadh
Mr X & Ms X and The Carlow County Council (the Council)
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-152637-T9X9D3
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-152637-T9X9D3
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Whether the Council was justified in refusing access to names and signatures on a Local Improvement Scheme application form
13 October 2025
According to the gov.ie website, the Local Improvement Scheme (LIS) is an important part of the delivery of the Government’s Our Rural Future Rural Development Policy 2021-2025 with respect to improving rural infrastructure and connectivity. The LIS is funded by the Department of Rural and Community Development (the Department). Its purpose is to help local authorities carry out improvement works on private and non-publicly maintained roads. Local authorities administer the LIS and are responsible for selecting and prioritising upgrades. Certain criteria must be met for a road to be eligible, and local contributions are required to be paid.
On 7 December 2023, the applicants made an FOI request for access to records concerning a 2021 road upgrade that was carried out under the LIS. They said that the requested records should include an application form, the name of the person delegated as correspondent for the grant applicants, the names and addresses of all applicants, and a list of all other persons who did not join in the application.
The Council’s decision of 15 January 2024 covered 14 records. In particular, record 1 is the two-page LIS application form and an Ordnance Survey map. The Council partially released record 1 and relied on section 37(1) of the FOI Act (personal information) in relation to the withheld excerpts.
On 12 February 2024, the applicants sought an internal review of the Council’s decision on certain records, including record 1. The Council’s internal review decision of 9 April 2024 affirmed its decision on the records concerned.
On 7 October 2024, the applicants applied to this Office for a review of the Council’s decision to withhold “the names that were submitted on the application form ”.
During the review, I consulted with third parties whose interests may be affected by the release of the details at issue. No response has been received from any of the parties concerned.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act and I have decided to conclude it by way of a formal, binding decision. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the above exchanges, correspondence between this Office, the Council, the third parties and the applicants, the details at issue and the provisions of the FOI Act.
As noted above, the OIC application is confined to the Council’s decision to withhold “the names that were submitted on the application form ”. I informed the applicants that my review would be confined to the following parts of record 1:
(i) the name of the agent/grant applicant representative, as contained in paragraph 2 on page 1,
(ii) the signature(s) of the grant applicant(s), as contained on paragraph 3 on page 1/List 1,
(iii) the name(s) of the person(s) benefitting from but not joined in the grant application, as contained in paragraph 8 on page 2/List 2; and
(iv) the name(s) of various landowners, as annotated on the attached map.
The applicants have not commented on the above approach and I am proceeding accordingly. As I noted above at (ii), List 1 contains the signature(s), rather than the name(s), of the grant applicant(s). In circumstances where such name(s) are not contained elsewhere in record 1, I am satisfied that my review may extend to the signature(s) concerned.
The scope of the review is concerned with whether the Council was justified in refusing access to the above details under section 37(1) of the Act. It does not extend to examining the Council’s performance of its functions, such as its administration of the relevant LIS application or its handling of the applicants’ complaint, or any other issue, including the applicants’ allegations about various Council staff and others. My review cannot take account of the applicants’ views on these matters.
The Council’s decisions
While not relevant to my review, I wish to draw the Council’s attention to sections 13(2)(d) and 21(5)(c) of the FOI Act. These provisions specify the details that must be contained in original and internal review decisions which are refusing records, such as findings on relevant material issues, and particulars of any matter relating to the public interest that have been taken into account.
The Council’s decision of 15 January 2024 falls short of the relevant requirements. Essentially, it consists of a schedule of records, giving very brief reasons as to why various FOI exemption provisions apply. It does not deal with the exceptions to section 37(1) as set out in section 37(2) of the FOI Act, or with the public interest test in section 37(5)(a). While the Council’s internal review decision addresses the public interest, it does not deal with all aspects of section 37(2).
It is the applicants’ position that the upgrade interfered with/trespassed on their property. They say that their consent to the works should have been sought and that they need to know who applied for the upgrade.
Section 13(4) of the Act provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a request, any reason that a requester gives for the request shall be disregarded. This means that in this case, I cannot have regard to the applicants’ motives for making their request, except in so far as those motives reflect what might be regarded as public interest factors in favour of release of the information where the Act requires a consideration of the public interest.
Section 25(3) of the FOI Act requires me to take all reasonable precautions in the performance of my functions to prevent the disclosure of information contained in an exempt record or that would cause the record to be exempt if it contained that information. Furthermore, section 25(3) requires me to limit the description I can give of the withheld information and of reasons for certain aspects of my decision in this case.
Release of records under FOI is generally understood to have the same effect as publishing them to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which the information contained in those records may be put.
Section 37 - personal information
Section 37(1)
Section 37(1), subject to other provisions of section 37, requires the refusal of a request if access to the record concerned would involve the disclosure of personal information (including personal information relating to a deceased individual).
Section 2 of the FOI Act defines personal information as information about an identifiable individual that (a) would ordinarily be known only to the individual or members of the family, or friends, of the individual, or (b) is held by a public body on the understanding that it would be treated by it as confidential. Section 2 also lists 14 non-exhaustive examples of what must be considered to be personal information, including (ii) information relating to the financial affairs of the individual and (xiii) information relating to property of the individual. Where information is captured by one or more of these 14 examples, there is no need for the requirements at (a) or (b) of the definition to also be met.
Section 2 of the FOI Act excludes certain information from being considered as personal information. Where the individual holds or held a position as a member of the staff of an FOI body, personal information does not include his or her name, or information relating to the position, the functions of the position, the terms upon and subject to which the individual holds or held that position, or anything written or recorded in any form by the individual in the course of and for the purpose of the performance of his or her functions (Paragraph I refers).
However, the exclusions do not cover all information relating to public servants. This Office considers that the exclusions are intended, in essence, to ensure that section 37 cannot be used to exempt the identity of a public servant in the context of the particular position held, or any records created by the relevant person while carrying out his or her official functions, or information relating to the terms, conditions and functions of positions. The exclusions do not deprive public servants or contractors of the right to privacy generally.
The Council’s original decision says only that details such as names comprise personal information. Its internal review decision does not elaborate on why it considers section 37 to apply. However, it refers to the "potential for applicant names to become part of the public record during discussions". I queried this with the Council and I have made the applicants aware of its response.
The Council says that LIS applications are validated at Head Office, and forwarded to the Municipal District (MD) Engineering Office, which estimates costings, etc. It says that the MD office then arranges an in-committee meeting (comprised of only Elected Members of the District & Council Executive) to discuss the available funding and the proposed work required and costings for each lane. It says that the Elected Members are usually very familiar with the lanes and the communities served by the lanes, and openly discuss various factors (such as any needs to provide access for the elderly, medical needs or treatment, limited access of farmers to lands, length of time the application is on hands, etc.) when prioritising lanes for the programme. It says that these are not public meetings, and that the discussions are held in private without press or the public.
The Council says that the Elected Members then propose a priority list for their MD, which they agree to adopt at their next MD Meeting. It says that, typically, the MD Engineer outlines that the LIS applications have been inspected, works proposals examined and costed, and calls on the members to agree the adoption of the priority list as agreed at their meeting. It says that the Elected Members then agree to adopt their proposed priority list. It says that the names associated with LIS applications are not read out or disclosed at the public MD meetings or provided by way of hardcopy to the public or press.
The Council’s submission also says that the upgraded part of the lane does not serve access to the applicants’ landholding but, rather, is situated on a commonage area that links to the applicants’ landholding. It contends that the applicants’ rights were not impacted upon by the LIS application.
Further to the applicants’ contention that the LIS application was made by a Council employee, which is detailed further below, I note from the Council’s correspondence with the applicants that Council employees and their families are entitled to apply under the LIS.
The applicants say that the upgrade interfered with their own property and took place without their knowledge or consent, and that this was also the case with other neighbours with access to the relevant laneway. They say that the LIS requires all qualified landowners to be notified of any potential changes that may affect their properties, and that the application form must contain the signature of all landowners on whose land the works are to be carried out. They say that they need to know who applied for the works and that FOI cannot allow public bodies to conceal malfeasance. They say that, otherwise, individuals’ property rights may be adversely affected while the perpetrators’ identities are protected.
The applicants contend that the main beneficiary of the works was a particular Council employee (Employee A) and their family. They outline why they believe that the LIS application did not meet the eligibility requirements. They say that the upgrade was delivered much faster than is normally the case for eligible applicants, and contend that Employee A brought undue influence to bear on prioritising the upgrade for the benefit of their family. They make allegations about the behaviours of Employee A and their family, which they say arise because they are continuing to seek the grant applicants’ names.
The applicants allege that there was connivance between Employee A and at least two colleagues. They refer to a released record and say that it contains false declarations made by the employee’s colleague and external business partner (Employee B) about the compliance of the application with scheme requirements. They say that the Council’s investigation of their complaint regarding the matter was carried out by Employee B.
The applicants say that they complained to the Ombudsman, who found that the Council “did not process the application in accordance with the scheme criteria”. It is their position that public funds were allocated based on fraudulent information and on foot of a noncompliant administration process.
Further to the Council’s references to the General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR) in its decisions, which I detail further in relation to the public interest test at section 37(5)(a), the applicants say that the Council is using GDPR as a blanket to conceal the true nature of the LIS application. They say that no GDPR issues arise because, in their view, “all qualified and interested parties to this scheme are known to each other by way of collective signatures on the form, collective consent (or non-consent) and agreed apportionment of required contributions.”
The applicants say that the Council has taken a selective approach to redacting the records. They contrast certain released details, which they contend are irrelevant or should have been withheld, with the Council’s refusal to disclose the names of those who applied for and benefitted from the upgrade. They also say that there is no rationale to the Council’s redaction of the names of successful LIS applicants from the LIS priority lists because the relevant applications were to be considered at a public meeting of Tullow MD. While the priority lists are not under consideration, I will consider this argument in relation to the details that are covered by my review. Finally, while the applicants say that the allocation of public funds should be a matter for the public record, they also say that they understand all information relating to the LIS is a matter of public record because they are funded by public monies.
At the outset, it is important to note that I have no role in determining property rights.
Many of the applicants’ arguments as set out above are more relevant to the consideration of the public interest test than to section 37(1). However, certain of them may also be taken as arguing that the information cannot be exempt under section 37(1) because of (i) their contention that their own property was affected by the upgrade, (ii) the Ombudsman’s findings, and (iii) their apparent view that the details concern the actions of public servants in the course of their work. They may also argue that granting access to the relevant details would not “disclose” personal information, and that the Council’s disclosure of certain other personal information requires the disclosure of the remaining details.
The applicants believe that Employee A was a party to the LIS application. Section 25(3) precludes me from confirming whether this is the case. However, I note the Council’s position that staff and their families may apply under the LIS. Even if Employee A is a grant applicant, I am satisfied that their name would not be captured by the exclusion in Paragraph I of section 2 of the FOI Act. This is because the grant application would concern the employee’s private affairs, and because the form would not have been completed in the performance of their functions as a public servant.
I note here the applicants’ view that Employee A and other Council staff have engaged in misconduct in the course of their work. I have already outlined that I cannot make any judgment on such a matter and explained why I can make no comment on the content of the details at issue. That said, it is debatable how an LIS application form can enable a judgment on such matters. In any event, misconduct could not be characterised as being for the purpose of the performance of the employees’ functions. In other words, records disclosing employee misconduct would qualify as personal information for the purposes of section 37(1) of the FOI Act.
I am satisfied, from the face of the record, that the details at issue relate to the property of the parties to/named in the LIS application. I am also satisfied that the details relate to the financial affairs of the grant applicants, if not also the person(s) named as benefitting from but not joined in the application. I am satisfied that the record contains personal information relating to the various third parties concerned (the third-party information).
The applicants appear to suggest that all information relating to the LIS is a matter of public record. However, the Council has explained that no press or the public are present at the in-committee meetings where names may be mentioned, that the official records of the MD meetings do not contain personal information of LIS applicants, and that names associated with applications on the priority lists are not disclosed at the public MD meetings. The applicants have not commented on the Council’s explanation. In all of the circumstances, I have no reason to consider that the third-party information at issue is in the public domain. I am satisfied, therefore, that granting access to the third-party information under FOI would “disclose ” personal information.
I note the differing views of the applicants and the Council on the matter of whether the upgrade affected the applicants’ property. However, even if the record comprises information relating to the applicants’ property (i.e. their personal information), in my view such details would be inextricably linked to the third-party information. The provisions of section 37(7) of the FOI Act would be relevant. Section 37(7) provides that, notwithstanding section 37(2)(a) (see below), access to a record shall be refused where access to it would, in addition to involving the disclosure of personal information relating to the requester, also involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual or individuals other than the requester.
The applicants say that “all qualified and interested parties to this scheme are known to each other by way of collective signatures on the form, collective consent (or non-consent) and agreed apportionment of required contributions .” While I will consider this argument in relation to section 37(2)(b) of the FOI Act, it should be noted that presumed or actual knowledge of any of the details at issue (whether by the parties to the application or others) does not, of itself, dis-apply section 37(1). In addition, it is not relevant to my consideration of section 37(1) whether the Council may have released some third-party personal information further to the applicants’ request, or whether it processed the LIS application in accordance with relevant criteria.
In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that granting access to the details at issue would involve the disclosure of third-party personal information. I find that section 37(1) of the FOI Act applies. This is subject to consideration of sections 37(2) and (5), however.
Section 37(2) - exceptions to section 37(1)
Section 37(2) of the FOI Act sets out certain circumstances in which 37(1) does not apply. In particular, section 37(2) provides that section 37(1) does not apply if: (a) the information concerned relates to the requester concerned; (b) any individual to whom the information relates consents, in writing or such other form as may be determined, to its disclosure to the requester; and (c) information of the same kind as that contained in the record in respect of individuals generally, or a class of individuals that is, having regard to all the circumstances, of significant size, is available to the general public.
The applicants argue that section 37(2)(a) applies on the basis that their property was affected by the upgrade. However, I have explained that, even if the withheld details also comprise the applicants’ personal information, in my view they would be inextricably linked to the third-party information, and that section 37(7) would apply. I find that the details do not fall to be released under section 37(2)(a) of the FOI Act.
While the applicants have not referred to section 37(2)(b), they say that GDPR issues do not arise because “all qualified and interested parties to this scheme are known to each other by way of collective signatures on the form, collective consent (or non-consent) and agreed apportionment of required contributions .” This may amount to an argument that section 37(2)(b) applies. However, I do not accept that the completion of the LIS application form (and/or the subsequent award of the grant) may be taken as consent by the grant applicants, or any party named in the form, to the disclosure of their personal information to either the applicants specifically or to the world at large. I will also say that, while I have not received any response to my letters to the third parties, in the overall circumstances and context of this case I do not consider it appropriate to assume that this amounts to their consent to the release of the details at issue. I am satisfied that section 37(2)(b) does not apply.
As noted, the applicants argue that names of successful LIS applicants should be released because the relevant applications were to be considered in a public MD meeting, which may be an argument that section 37(2)(c) of the FOI Act applies. I have already explained why I have no reason to consider that the third-party personal information at issue, and indeed similar such details on the LIS priority lists, is in the public domain. In the circumstances, I have no reason to consider that information of the same kind as that at issue in respect of individuals generally, or a class of individuals that is, having regard to all the circumstances, of significant size, is available to the general public. I find that section 37(2)(c) does not apply.
I am satisfied that none of the other circumstances set out in section 37(2) apply in this case, nor have any arguments been made that this is the case.
Section 37(5)
Section 37(5) of the FOI Act provides that a request that would fall to be refused under section 37(1) may still be granted where, on balance, (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates, or (b) the grant of the information would be to the benefit of the person to whom the information relates. I am satisfied that the release of the information at issue would not be to the benefit of the relevant third parties and that section 37(5)(b) does not apply.
Before I consider the applicability of section 37(5)(a), there are a number of important points to note. First, section 13(4) provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. In relation to the question of the public interest, this means that I cannot have regard to the applicant's motives for seeking access to the records at issue, except in so far as those motives reflect, or overlap with, what might be regarded as true public interest factors in favour of release of the records, i.e. insofar as the concerns raised in relation to the request may also be matters of general concern to the wider public.
Secondly, it is important to note that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under the Act can be put. This means that in considering whether a right of access exists to records under section 37(5)(a) of the Act, any decision to grant access would be on the basis that there is an overriding public interest in the release of the records effectively to the world at large that outweighs the privacy rights of the third-party individuals concerned.
It is also important to note that the FOI Act recognises the public interest in the protection of the right to privacy both in the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the Act (which makes clear that the release of records under FOI must be consistent with the right to privacy). It is also worth noting that the right to privacy has a constitutional dimension, as one of the unenumerated personal rights under the Constitution. Moreover, unlike other public interest tests provided for in the FOI Act, there is a discretionary element to section 37(5)(a), which is a further indication of the very strong public interest in the right to privacy. Privacy rights will therefore be set aside only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) is sufficiently strong to outweigh the public interest in protecting privacy.
In considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I have had regard to section 11(3) of the Act which provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and to promote adherence by them to the principles of transparency in government and public affairs and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies. However, in doing so, I have also had regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57 (“the Enet judgment”). In that case, the Supreme Court found that a general principle of openness does not suffice to direct release of records in the public interest and “there must be a sufficiently specific, cogent and fact-based reason to tip the balance in favour of disclosure”. Although the Court’s comments were made in cases involving confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, I consider them to be relevant to the consideration of public interest tests generally.
The applicants say that the upgrade was carried out on lands owned by them without their consent and that there was trespass. They say that, in itself, this malfeasance carries more weight than privacy rights. They say that multiple wrongs do not make a right, and that they, as law-abiding innocent parties, have been disadvantaged and poorly treated by an instrument of the State.
The applicants say that the allocation of public funds should be a matter for the public record. They also essentially argue that, in light of the Ombudsman’s findings, public funds were allocated when they should have been refused.
The applicants allege that certain Council employees carried out wrongdoing in the course of performing their functions and that the Council’s treatment of their FOI request seeks to conceal these matters. They say that FOI cannot allow public bodies to conceal wrongdoing and protect the perpetrators’ identities at the expense of adverse effects on individuals’ property rights.
The Council’s position is that disclosure of the relevant details would breach privacy rights and that this does not serve the public interest. It says that the Department asks local authorities not to provide it with personal information of householders/landowners to the Department. The Council says that this indicates a regard, within the scheme nationally, of the privacy of the personal information used within it.
The Council’s internal review decision refers to the GDPR, and says that advice was sought from the Council’s Data Protection officer. Its submission also refers to the GDPR and, overall, expresses concern that disclosure of personal information under FOI would amount to a privacy breach, which may be reportable to and/or subject to investigation by the Data Protection Commission.
The Council refers to the Senior Investigator’s comments in Case No. OIC-133560-K3R2D3 about the appropriate balancing of competing interests. I have referred the applicants to the decision concerned, which also concerned records relating to an LIS application. It is important to note that the Senior Investigator issued his decision after the Council decided on the request in this case.
To summarise the Senior Investigator’s comments in Case No. 133560, he said that it was important to have regard to the nature and purpose of the LIS in considering where the balance of the public interest lies. He noted that the LIS allows for the expenditure of public funds on the carrying out of works on private roads, provided certain eligibility criteria are met. He said that, as a general proposition, there is a significant public interest in the disclosure of information such as the basis on which a local authority decides that any particular LIS application is eligible for inclusion, the basis on which projects are included in any one year, the details of the works undertaken and the extent of the use of public monies on such projects. He said that the disclosure of such information would, among other things, serve as a significant aid to ensuring effective oversight of public expenditure on LIS schemes, to ensuring the public body obtains value for money, to preventing fraud and corruption, to preventing the waste or misuse of public funds, and to ensuring that all LIS applicants are treated fairly.
The Senior Investigator also said that such disclosure would also likely involve the disclosure of certain personal information about identifiable individuals, and that it was necessary to take account of the extent to which privacy rights would be breached by such disclosure.
In this respect, the Senior Investigator compared LIS applications to applications for grant assistance that are prompted by a grant applicant’s highly sensitive personal circumstances, such as grants that are sought and approved on the basis of the intrinsically private and sensitive circumstances of an applicant’s age and health, and/or the general condition of their home. He expressed a view that there is considerable weight to the public interest in protecting personal information relating to such grant applications.
The Senior Investigator went on to say that, while LIS assistance is also payable regarding private property, the general circumstances in which LIS grants may be sought and approved are not based on the applicant’s highly sensitive personal circumstances. He noted that they reflect the benefit that the relevant private property (a road) provides to a wider section of the general public, as well as to the applicant. He said that, speaking generally, he considered certain personal information relating to an individual’s LIS application to be less private and sensitive than other personal information that the associated records may contain.
The Council says that its decisions on the applicants’ request sought to balance the competing interests by releasing as much information as possible from record 1 while also upholding the privacy rights of individuals. It says also that the applicants were able to complain about its decision making and administration of the grant application under appropriate processes, and were not hindered from doing so by the redaction of names. I understand that the Council has also now changed the application and validation process for the LIS.
I will firstly address the Council’s concerns about the GDPR. Article 86 of the GDPR provides that personal data in official documents held by a public authority or a public body or a private body for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest may be disclosed by the authority or body in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public authority or body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to the Regulation. Section 44 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides that, for the purposes of Article 86, personal data contained in a record may be disclosed where a request for access to a record is granted under and in accordance with the FOI Act 2014 pursuant to an FOI request.
In short, data protection legislation does not prohibit public bodies from processing FOI requests where the records sought contain personal information relating to individuals other than the requester. The FOI Act is entirely independent of data protection legislation and FOI requests for access to records must be processed in accordance with the provisions of the FOI Act. Indeed, the FOI Act provides for the release of personal information of third parties in certain circumstances, including where the public interest in granting the request outweighs, on balance, the public interest in protecting the privacy rights of the individuals concerned. As such, in considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I am satisfied that the question of whether or not release is in compliance with GDPR is not a relevant factor that I must consider.
As I have indicated above, section 11(3) of the Act provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies.
I have explained that I can only take account of the applicants’ motives for making their request, or their private interests in obtaining the requested information, insofar as they reflect what might be regarded as public interest factors in favour of release of the personal information at issue. Essentially, their comments can be taken as arguing that the public interest requires the disclosure of the details at issue in order to give further transparency on the matters of (i) the identity/ies of the grant applicant(s), (ii) the Council’s consideration and administration of the LIS application (including the alleged actions of certain Council employees), and (iii) the Council’s disbursal of public monies. They argue that that the public interest in disclosure in this case is entitled to greater weight than privacy rights, particularly given the Ombudsman’s finding on the Council’s administration of the LIS application, which they contend means that public monies were allocated under the LIS which should have been refused. They also appear to contend that the public interest in disclosure is entitled to significant weight because of their position that the upgrade was carried out on lands owned by them without their consent.
At the outset, I acknowledge that the LIS application at issue does not derive from the highly sensitive personal circumstances of the grant applicant(s). I also acknowledge that any award of an LIS grant reflects the benefit provided to a wider section of the general public than just the grant applicant(s). However, this does not mean that there should be no protection whatsoever of third-party privacy rights. Even if the third-party personal information may be considered as not particularly sensitive (with a commensurate effect on the weight to the public interest in protecting privacy rights), the weight of the public interest(s) favouring release must be greater in order for me to direct its release under section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act.
It should be noted that the Senior Investigator’s comments in Case No. 135560 concerned a case where no information had been released further to the FOI request concerned. In contrast, the Council has disclosed most of the records covered by the scope of this request, including the vast majority of record 1. As I have informed the applicants, the Council has revealed the basis on which the LIS application was made, the nature and total cost of the works and the contribution paid. In my view, such disclosure enables a considerable degree of public understanding and scrutiny of the Council’s administration of the grant application/upgrade works, including the cost to the public purse.
Even if the details at issue also concern the applicants’ property, neither this nor the Ombudsman’s finding of themselves provide a basis on which I may direct the release of third-party personal information in the public interest. Indeed, I note that the Ombudsman’s findings concerned the Council’s adherence to the scheme criteria in its processing of the LIS application and was not concerned with the identities of the grant applicant(s).
It seems to me that disclosure of the details at issue enables little or no further scrutiny of the Council’s consideration of the LIS application’s eligibility and the disbursement of public monies, or the Elected Members’ decision to include the upgrade in the 2021 programme. Neither are the withheld details required in order to raise and pursue concerns about the Council’s consideration and administration of the LIS application.
The applicants appear to argue that disclosure of the details will serve a public interest in revealing the parties to the LIS application. However, it is important to note this Office’s view that the FOI Act was designed to increase openness and transparency in the way in which FOI bodies conduct their operations. In general terms, it was not designed as a means by which the actions of third-party individuals were to be opened up to scrutiny. Furthermore, and while I can make no comment on the content of the details at issue, I have noted the Council’s position that staff and their families may apply under the LIS.
The applicants also appear to argue that disclosure will reveal the extent to which Employee A and other Council staff may have been involved in approving and prioritising the grant application, and thus provide transparency on the Council’s performance of its functions. As I have already noted, it seems to me that the disclosure of the details at issue will provide little or no insight into this matter.
In my view, the above circumstances significantly reduce the weight of the public interest in disclosure of the details at issue.
I will now consider the weight to attach to the public interest in protecting privacy rights regarding the information at issue. I note here that the decision in Case No. 133560 did not suggest that all personal information concerning LIS applications should be released. Rather, the Senior Investigator referred to the disclosure of certain such personal information in the interest of promoting the effective oversight of public expenditure on LIS schemes, preventing fraud, corruption, and the waste or misuse of public funds, and ensuring that all LIS applicants are treated fairly. It seems to me that the various details that the Council has released further to the applicants’ request are of the less private and sensitive type of personal information that the Senior Investigator envisaged should be generally released to serve the above public interests.
It seems to me that the signature(s) at issue and the name(s) of any party listed as benefitting from but not joined to the application amount to particularly sensitive personal information. I consider the remaining details to be reasonably sensitive, in that they would enable specific insights into matters concerning the property and financial affairs of the grant applicant(s). I am satisfied that there are commensurate weights to the public interest in protecting against breaches of privacy rights regarding such details.
Having considered the matter very carefully, on balance, I do not consider that the public interest in disclosing the details at issue outweighs the public interest in protecting the rights to privacy of the individuals to whom the details relate. I find that the details do not fall to be released further to the provisions of section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm the Council’s decision, on the basis that the relevant details are exempt from release under section 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
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Anne Lyons
Investigator