Cinneadh
Mr X and Trinity College Dublin
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-153388-Y7F4X5
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-153388-Y7F4X5
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Whether TCD was justified in refusing access to the applicant’s correspondence with Human Resources and two named TCD staff relating to staffing issues in a particular unit and records relating to his dismissal
9 October 2025
On 27 May 2024, the applicant made an FOI request to TCD for access to all correspondence between himself, Human Resources (HR) and two named TCD staff members. He said that the records should include his PIP and his response to it.
According to TCD’s decision of 4 September 2024, it asked the applicant to clarify the scope of his request. The decision says that, on 30 May 2024, the applicant said that he wanted access to “all correspondence, relating to all the staff and staff issues in [a particular unit], the day of my 1st, successful appraisal up until the week after I was dismissed last March. To Include everything, all my requests, emails about the bullying, requests for assistance and behaviour of the staff, to [name of staff member], Hr and [name of other staff member], and all the responses I got from [HR and the two named staff members]. Also my PIP and my response to it, also my dismissal letter, and the minutes from my dismissal meeting”.
It appears that TCD twice told the applicant that it was extending the normal four week deadline for reply to his FOI request further to the provisions of section 14 of the FOI Act.
On 4 September 2024, TCD part-granted the request. The decision covered 62 records. TCD said that it was releasing some records in full and in part, and withholding the rest under sections 15(1)(i) of the FOI Act (information already released), 30(1)(b) (functions relating to management), 32(1)(c) (facilitate the commission of an offence), 35(1)(a) (information given in confidence) and 37(1) (personal information) of the FOI Act.
The applicant sought an internal review of TCD’s decision on 11 September 2024. On 3 October 2024, TCD affirmed its decision on the applicant’s request.
On 3 November 2024, the applicant applied to this Office for a review of TCD’s decision. During the review, TCD said that it would release some further parts of records 5, 10 and 14 and that it would fully release record 16.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act and I have decided to conclude it by way of a formal, binding decision. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the above exchanges, correspondence between this Office, TCD and the applicant, the contents of the records at issue and the provisions of the FOI Act.
As the applicant is aware, my review will not examine TCD’s decisions to extend the timeframe for issuing its original decision. Neither will it consider the additional records described in the applicant’s correspondence with this Office. Such records were not covered by the scope of the request. For completeness, the internal review application did not query the adequacy of TCD’s searches for the requested records.
TCD has now fully released records 12, 13, 16, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 42-45, 48, 55, 57, 59, 61 and 62. As the applicant knows, my review does not extend to records 9, 11, 35, 46, 50, 52-54 and 56. I am satisfied that, respectively, these records are either duplicates of, or are included in, records 23, 5, 27, 4, 32, 38, 39, 32 and 4. In addition, the applicant has not disputed either my understanding that he is not seeking access to the remainder of record 14 (names) or my intention not to consider records 41, 49 and 51. As I explained to the applicant, record 41 is a copy of his FOI request and, in my view, records 49 and 51 concern matters other than staff/staff issues and the applicant’s dismissal. I am proceeding accordingly.
Further to the above, this review is confined to the sole issue of whether TCD’s decision to fully or partially withhold records 1-8, 10, 15, 17-20, 22-24, 27, 29, 30, 32-34, 36-40, 47, 58 and 60 was justified under the FOI Act. My review does not extend to any aspect of TCD’s performance of its functions, or to obtaining answers to queries that the applicant has put to TCD during the FOI process.
The applicant says that he needs the records for his solicitor and “to facilitate the next step”. However, section 13(4) of the Act provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a request, any reason that a requester gives for the request shall be disregarded. This means that in this case, I cannot have regard to any motives that the applicant may have for making the request, except in so far as those motives reflect what might be regarded as public interest factors in favour of release of the information where the Act requires a consideration of the public interest.
The applicant says that the numerous redactions cast a lot of ambiguity on the context of the correspondence and records. Section 18(1) of the FOI Act provides, that "if it is practicable to do so", access to an otherwise exempt record shall be granted by preparing a copy, in such form as the head of the public body concerned considers appropriate, of the record with the exempt information removed. Section 18(1) does not apply, however, if the copy provided for thereby would be misleading (section 18(2) refers).
It should be noted that, while TCD has granted access to various excerpts of the records, this Office takes the view that the provisions of section 18 do not envisage or require the extracting of particular sentences or occasional paragraphs from records for the purpose of granting access to those particular sentences or paragraphs. Generally speaking, therefore, this Office is not in favour of the cutting or 'dissecting' of records to such an extent. Being 'practicable' necessarily means taking a reasonable and proportionate approach in determining whether to grant access to parts of records.
It is important to note that section 25(3) of the FOI Act requires me to take all reasonable precautions in the performance of my functions to prevent the disclosure of information contained in an exempt record or that would cause the record to be exempt if it contained that information. Furthermore, section 25(3) also requires me to limit the description I can give of the withheld information and of reasons for certain aspects of my decision in this case.
Release of records under FOI is generally understood to have the same effect as publishing them to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which the information contained in those records may be put.
In relevant part, section 15(1)(i) of the FOI Act provides that a head may refuse to grant a request where it relates to records already released to the same requester where the records are available to the requester concerned.
While TCD has withheld part of the cover email in record 7 under section 37(1) of the FOI Act, it fully withheld the related attachment under section 15(1)(i). It says that it has already given hard and soft copies of this record to the applicant. I informed the applicant that TCD’s comments give me no reason to believe that it provided the record to him for a restricted purpose. I have not received any comments from the applicant on the matter. In the circumstances, I accept that the relevant attachment has already been released, and is available, to the requester. I find that section 15(1)(i) of the FOI applies.
Section 32(1)(c) provides for the refusal of an FOI request if access to the record concerned could, in the opinion of the head, reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence. When relying on this exemption, the FOI body should explain how the release of the particular contents of the record at issue could make the commission of an offence easier. It should indicate the nature of the relevant offence(s). It should also consider the reasonableness of such an outcome occurring.
TCD claims that section 32(1)(c) applies to records 1 and 2 and the remainder of record 10. It says that records 1 and 2 reveal how physical cash is handled by the relevant unit, and identify the staff involved in ordering and handling physical cash around the campus. It confirms that, although two years old, the relevant details remain current. Record 2 also contains information about cash levels in the relevant unit. Although I do not consider it appropriate to include its explanation here, I am satisfied from TCD’s submission that the details remain indicative today. The remainder of record 10 outlines a further procedure for the handling of cash, which TCD confirms also remains current. Overall, TCD’s position is that disclosure of the records could result in staff and/or the relevant unit being targeted for theft and thereby facilitate the commission of an offence.
The applicant has not taken issue with TCD’s explanation. In the circumstances, I accept that disclosure of the relevant details could reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence. I find that section 32(1)(c) of the FOI Act applies to records 1 and 2 and the remainder of record 10.
Section 32(1) is subject to section 32(3), which provides that consideration must be given to the possibility that the public interest would be better served by the release of the information rather than by it being withheld, in the event that one of three conditions is fulfilled. Neither TCD nor the applicant have made any arguments that section 32(3) applies. However, having regard to the content of the withheld details, I am satisfied that no such circumstances arise in this case, and I find that section 32(3) does not apply.
TCD relies on section 37(1) of the FOI Act in relation to the remaining details, including the remainder of record 5 and the redactions to record 58 (which it had initially withheld under section 35).
Section 37(1) provides that, subject to the other provisions of the section, an FOI body shall refuse a request if access to the record concerned would involve the disclosure of personal information (including personal information relating to a deceased individual).
Personal information is defined in section 2 of the FOI Act as information about an identifiable individual that (a) would ordinarily be known only to the individual or members of the family, or friends, of the individual, or (b) is held by a public body on the understanding that it would be treated by it as confidential. The definition also includes a list of 14 non-exhaustive examples of what must be considered as personal information. Where information can be classified as one of these 14 examples, there is no need for the requirements at (a) or (b) of the definition to also be met. The examples include (i) information relating to the educational and medical history of the individual, (iii) information relating to the employment or employment history of the individual, and (xiv) the views or opinions of any other person about the individual.
Section 2 of the FOI Act excludes certain information from being considered as personal information. Where the individual holds or held a position as a member of the staff of an FOI body, personal information does not include his or her name, or information relating to the position, the functions of the position, the terms upon and subject to which the individual holds or held that position, or anything written or recorded in any form by the individual in the course of and for the purpose of the performance of his or her functions (Paragraph I refers). Section 2 contains similar exclusions where contractors are concerned (Paragraph II refers).
However, the exclusions do not cover all information relating to public servants or contractors. This Office considers that the exclusions are intended, in essence, to ensure that section 37 cannot be used to exempt the identity of a public servant or a service provider in the context of the particular position held or service provided, or any records created by the relevant person while carrying out his or her official functions or while providing the service, or information relating to the terms, conditions and functions of positions or contracts. The exclusions do not deprive public servants or contractors of the right to privacy generally.
Section 25(3) limits me in the description I can give of TCD’s submission because otherwise parties, including the applicant, may be identifiable.
In summary, TCD says that third parties are identifiable from the details at issue, even if names were redacted. It describes the relevant unit, its location and the small number of staff therein. It explains why other staff are likely to be aware of the relevant personnel, and says also that staff details are available on the College website. It argues that the details at issue concern the working environment and staff behaviour in the relevant unit. It says that the records contain allegations and that some of the details may not be entirely accurate.
I accept TCD’s argument that, even without names, third parties are identifiable from the details at issue. I note here TCD’s arguments about the nature, location and size of the relevant unit and how other staff are likely to know the relevant personnel.
Bearing in mind the requirements of section 25(3), I am satisfied that the records largely relate to work-related issues within the relevant unit, including interpersonal disputes between the applicant and various parties. Certain details relate to the medical history of parties other than the applicant and the reasons for some parties being unable to attend work. However, overall, the records relate to the employment history of the applicant and others, and they include the views of the various parties about each other. I am satisfied that the records comprise personal information. Furthermore, having regard to the content of the records and the context in which they were created, I am satisfied that the details are not of a type that is captured by the exclusions in section 2 of the FOI Act.
I accept that the details at issue relate to the applicant, such that they comprise his personal information. However, in all of the circumstances set out above, I am also satisfied that the applicant’s personal information is inextricably linked to personal information relating to other identifiable individuals. This is generally called “joint personal information”. The provisions of section 37(7) of the FOI Act are relevant. Section 37(7) provides that, notwithstanding section 37(2)(a) (see below), access to a record shall be refused where access to it would, in addition to involving the disclosure of personal information relating to the requester, also involve the disclosure of personal information relating to an individual or individuals other than the requester.
I find that section 37(1) of the FOI Act applies to the relevant details. In addition, even if section 15(1)(i) does not apply to the attachment to record 7, I would consider it to qualify for exemption under section 37(1) of the FOI Act on the basis set out above. It is not relevant to section 37(1) whether the relevant record may already be in the applicant’s possession.
Section 37(2) of the FOI Act sets out certain circumstances in which 37(1) does not apply. Neither TCD nor the applicant have made any arguments regarding the application of section 37(2).
However, section 37(2)(a) provides for the grant of access to personal information relating to the requester. The applicant may argue that section 37(2)(a) applies because the records relate to him. However, as I have already explained, the records comprise joint personal information and section 37(7) is relevant. I find that section 37(2)(a) of the FOI Act does not apply.
I am satisfied that the remaining circumstances set out in section 37(2) do not arise.
Section 37(5) provides that a request that would fall to be refused under section 37(1) may still be granted where, on balance (a) the public interest that the request should be granted outweighs the right to privacy of the individual to whom the information relates, or (b) the grant of the request would benefit the person to whom the information relates. I have no reason to consider that section 37(5)(b) applies, and the applicant has made no arguments to this effect.
Before I consider the applicability of section 37(5)(a), there are a number of important points to note. First, section 13(4) provides that, subject to the Act, in deciding whether to grant or refuse an FOI request, any reason that the requester gives for the request and any belief or opinion of the FOI body as to the reasons for the request shall be disregarded. In relation to the question of the public interest, this means that I cannot have regard to an applicant's motives for seeking access to the records at issue, except in so far as those motives reflect, or overlap with, what might be regarded as true public interest factors in favour of release of the records, i.e. insofar as the concerns raised in relation to the request may also be matters of general concern to the wider public.
Secondly, it is important to note that the release of records under the FOI Act must be regarded, in effect, as release to the world at large, given that the Act places no constraints on the uses to which a record released under the Act can be put. With certain limited exceptions provided for under the Act (such as the Regulations made under section 37(8), which are not relevant in this case) FOI is not about granting access to information to particular individuals only. Furthermore, as noted above, a requester's reasons for making a request are generally not of relevance. Thus, records are not released under FOI for any limited or restricted purpose.
All of this means that, in considering whether a right of access exists to records under section 37(5)(a) of the Act, any decision to grant access would be on the basis that there is an overriding public interest in the release of the records effectively to the world at large that outweighs the privacy rights of the third-party individuals concerned.
In considering where the balance of the public interest lies in this case, I have had regard to section 11(3) of the Act which provides that in performing any functions under the Act, an FOI body must have regard to, among other things, the need to achieve greater openness in the activities of FOI bodies and to promote adherence by them to the principles of transparency in government and public affairs and the need to strengthen the accountability and improve the quality of decision making of FOI bodies. However, in doing so, I have had regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court inThe Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and the Information Commissioner & Ors [2020] IESC 57 (the eNet judgment). In relevant part, the Supreme Court found that a general principle of openness does not suffice to direct release of records in the public interest and "there must be a sufficiently specific, cogent and fact-based reason to tip the balance in favour of disclosure". Although the Court's comments were made in cases involving confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, I consider them to be relevant to the consideration of public interest tests generally.
TCD makes no arguments regarding section 37(5)(a). The applicant says that he needs the records for his solicitor and “to facilitate the next step”. He does not make any arguments in relation to the public interest. However, it seems to me that there is a public interest in providing insight into, and enabling scrutiny of, TCD’s performance of its functions in relation to the applicant.
As noted, TCD has not made any arguments regarding the public interest. In addition, the applicant appears dissatisfied with TCD’s performance of its functions in relation to him. However, neither of these factors provide me with a basis for directing the release of third-party personal information further to the provisions of section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act.
Having considered the details at issue, it seems to me that their disclosure will provide some further insight into, and enable scrutiny of, TCD’s performance of its functions in relation to the applicant. In my view, there is reasonable weight to the public interest in disclosing the relevant records.
On the other hand, the FOI Act recognises the public interest in the protection of the right to privacy both in the language of section 37 and the Long Title to the Act (which makes clear that the release of records under FOI must be consistent with the right to privacy). Furthermore, unlike other public interest tests provided for in the FOI Act, there is a discretionary element to section 37(5)(a), which is a further indication of the very strong public interest in the right to privacy. The statutory privacy rights afforded by the FOI Act relating to personal information will be set aside by this Office only where the public interest served by granting the request (and breaching those rights) outweighs the public interest in protecting privacy.
I satisfied that the third-party personal information at issue is very private and sensitive information. I am satisfied that its disclosure to the world at large would result in a significant breach of the third parties’ rights to privacy. I am satisfied that there is significant weight to the public interest in protecting against such breaches.
Having considered the matter, on balance, I do not consider that the public interest in the disclosure of the withheld details outweighs the rights to privacy of the third parties to whom the withheld details relate. I find that section 37(5)(a) of the FOI Act does not apply.
In the circumstances, there is no need for me to consider TCD’s other claims for exemptions in relation to any of the details concerned.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm TCD’s decision. I find that the withheld details are exempt under sections 15(1)(i), 32(1)(c) and 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Anne Lyons
Investigator