Cinneadh
Mr X and Health Service Executive
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-155530-M9M0X2
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara Faisnéise
Cásuimhir: OIC-155530-M9M0X2
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Whether the HSE was justified in refusing access to various records relating to a data breach reported by the applicant on the basis of sections 15(1)(g), 29(1)(a), 30(1)(a) and/or 37(1) of the FOI Act
7 November 2025
In a request dated 16 May 2024 (Request 2), the applicant sought access to records relating to an alleged data breach that the HSE had deemed to fall outside the scope of an earlier request he had made on 2 February 2023 (Request 1). The HSE’s decision on Request 1 was the subject of a review by this Office (Case OIC-140328 refers). In its decision on Request 2, the HSE said that its decision in respect of Request 1, where the records in question were deemed to fall outside the scope of the request, had been reviewed and upheld by this Office. The applicant applied to this Office for a review of the HSE’s decision in respect of Request 2, Case OIC-151147 refers. During the course of the review in Case OIC-151147, the HSE acknowledged that certain records exist that had not been considered for release. On 22 October 2024, we annulled the HSE’s decision and directed that a fresh decision be made on Request 2.
The HSE issued its decision in two parts. On 12 December 2024, the HSE’s Mental Health Services issued a decision wherein it part-granted the request. It refused access to certain information and records under sections 29(1), 30(1)(a), and 37(1) of the FOI Act. On 16 December 2024, the HSE’s Department of Consumer Affairs (Consumer Affairs) issued a decision wherein it part-granted the request. It refused access to certain records under sections 29(1) and 30(1)(a) of the Act. The applicant sought an internal review of both decisions, following which the HSE affirmed both decisions. On 20 January 2025, the applicant sought a review by this Office of both decisions. He made submissions on the matter on 4 February 2025.
In its submissions to this office during the course of the review, the HSE argued that the request fell to be refused under section 15(1)(g) of the Act and it made detailed submissions in respect of the applicability of that provision. This Office’s Investigator notified the applicant of the HSE’s revised position and details of the submissions made, and he invited the applicant to make further submission. The applicant provided a further submission to this Office on 29 September 2025.
I have now completed my review in accordance with section 22(2) of the FOI Act. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the correspondence outlined above. I have decided to conclude this review by way of a formal, binding decision.
The scope of this review is concerned with whether the HSE was justified in refusing to grant the remainder of the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(g) of the FOI Act or alternatively, whether it was justified in withholding certain records under sections 29(1), 30(1)(a), and or 37(1) of the FOI Act.
Before I consider the substantive matters in this case, it is important to note that a review conducted by this Office is considered to be “de novo” which means here that the review is based on the circumstances and the law as they pertain at the time of my decision and is not confined to the basis upon which the FOI body reached its decision. Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to consider the applicability of section 15(1)(g) to the request regardless of the fact that the HSE did not initially rely on that provision in its decisions on the request.
Section 15 of the FOI Act provides various administrative grounds on which an FOI body may refuse to grant a request. Section 15(1)(g) provides that it may refuse to grant a request where it considers that the request is frivolous or vexatious or forms part of a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests. While section 15(1)(g) identifies three separate characteristics which may lead to a decision to refuse a request, they may often overlap. For instance, a request that is frivolous may also be vexatious, and what is frivolous and/or vexatious may also form part of a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests.
Generally speaking, a request is considered by this Office to be frivolous or vexatious where it has been made in bad faith or forms part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or an abuse of the right of access. We have previously set out a number of non-exhaustive factors that we consider relevant in assessing whether a request may be categorised as frivolous or vexatious and regard those non-exhaustive factors as equally relevant in determining whether or not there is evidence of a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests. This approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal inGrange v Information Commissioner [2022] IECA 153. The factors include, but are not limited to:
• The number of requests made - are they considered excessive by reasonable standards?
• The nature and scope of the requests - are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed? Alternatively, are the requests repetitive in character or are they used to revisit an issue that has previously been addressed?
• The purpose of the requests, e.g. have they been made for their nuisance value; are they made without reasonable or legitimate grounds; and/or are they intended to accomplish some objective unrelated to the access process?
• The sequencing of the requests - does the volume of requests or appeals increase following the initiation of court proceedings by the institution or the occurrence of some other related event?
• The intent of the requester - is the requester’s aim to harass the public body?
It must be stressed that this list is non-exhaustive, nor is it necessary for all of the above factors to be present before a request can be refused under section 15(1)(g).
Moreover, the outcome or cumulative effect of the requests is also a relevant consideration. It is also appropriate to consider the requests concerned in the context of other requests made to the FOI body and in the context of the requester’s other dealings with the FOI body concerned. On that latter point, I note that in her judgment inKelly v Information Commissioner [2014] IEHC 479, O’Malley J. found that this Office was not confined to considering the specific request and that it was entitled to consider the wider context in which the request was made. This view was endorsed by the Court of Appeal inGrange v the Information Commissioner [2022] IECA 153, which found that this Office was “entitled to take into account the history of dealings between the appellant and the Department and the previous FOI requests insofar as they were relevant to the appellant’s grievances, as well the context of the FOI request in question”.
It is also important to note that while section 13(4) of the FOI Act generally requires public bodies to disregard any reasons for the making of a request, motive can be relevant when considering the application of section 15(1)(g). In the aforementioned High Court proceedings, O’Malley J. stated that in determining whether a particular application should be described as vexatious, the Information Commissioner is entitled by statute to use his discretion. She stated that “there is no obligation on the Commissioner to prove the applicant’s state of mind, and inferences may be drawn on a common-sense basis from a pattern of conduct”.
When considering whether a request forms part of a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests, it seems to me that the question I must consider is not whether each request, of itself, is manifestly unreasonable. Rather, I believe that the appropriate approach to take is to consider whether the requests, when considered together, form a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests such that any request forming part of that pattern may be refused under section 15(1)(g).
In its submissions to this Office the HSE said that the records that fall within the scope of the applicant’s request relate to an alleged data breach by a staff member who was involved in the applicant’s care and treatment. It said the alleged breach is and has been under review with the Data Protection Commission (DPC) since January 2024. It said it endeavoured to resolve the alleged data breach through correspondence with the applicant but that the matter remains unresolved.
The HSE said the request in question is very similar in nature to another FOI request the applicant submitted on 29 May 2025 (which was also the subject of a review by this Office in Case OIC-150928). It said both requests relate to alleged data breaches and that both are still under review with the DPC. It said the majority of the records involve administrative emails between internal HSE departments and correspondence with external bodies such as the DPC. It said the applicant has advised the HSE on many occasions of his intention to seek access to all of the administrative records between the HSE and this Office, in relation to the processing of his FOI requests. It argued that such an intention is at odds with the spirit of the FOI Act.
The HSE noted that our decision in Case OIC-150928 has compelled it to release a significant number of additional records. It said those records include the HSE’s Deputy Data Protection Officer (DDPO) submission to the DPC regarding the alleged data breach. It said it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage multiple FOI requests and appeals from the applicant. It argued that section 15(1)(g) should therefore be applied to the records currently under review. It said it considers that the FOI request further demonstrates that the applicant continues to submit a series of manifestly unreasonable requests. It said the applicability of section 15(1)(g) was first brought to the attention of this Office in 2021 in Case OIC-117818.
The HSE provided a table (see below) outlining details of 33 FOI requests the applicant had made since 2020.
| FOI ref | Date Rec'd | Description | OIC reference | ||
| 1 | 25085 | 15/01/2020 | Personal Mental Health Records | OIC-97608-C3Q2T4 | |
| 2 | 25504 | 15/04/2020 | Personal Mental Health Records | OIC-97817-N1V0F3 | |
| 3 | 25763 | 29/06/2020 | Request copies of all files held by Safeguarding | ||
| 4 | 25815 | 06/09/2020 | Records relating to a specified YSYS complaint including records generated by 2 named staff members | OIC-96232-S4B1G2 | |
| 5 | 26110 | 02/09/2020 | Records relating to an ongoing YSYS complaints process including records generated by 7 named staff members | ||
| 6 | 26685 | 29/12/2020 | Records held by MHS including records generated by 7 named staff members | ||
| 7 | 26953 | 17/02/2021 | Administrative records relating to two YSYS complaints including records generated by 5 named staff | ||
| 8 | 28254 | 23/10/2021 | Administrative Records relating to processing of FOI requests /SARs/complaints/OIC decisions | OIC-117818-G3N3W0 Decision Annulled 15(1)(g) | |
| 9 | 29938 | 15/07/2022 | Records relating to an OIC submission and internal correspondence between staff | ||
| 10 | 30522 | 19/10/2022 | Administrative records held by a named staff member | OIC-135868-N2C9G5 |
| 11 | 30522 | 19/10/2022 | Personal mental health records and internal communications amongst staff | OIC-135868-N2C9G5 |
| 12 | 30577 | 01/11/2022 | Records relating to a YSYS complaint | ||
| 13 | 30907 | 01/03/2023 | Records of communication between a named member of staff and MHS | OIC-142155-F5H2T2 | |
| 14 | 31136 | 02/02/2023 | Records of communications between 3 named staff members and any other parties. | OIC-137153-W7H4N1, OIC-140328-Q8G4K3 | |
| 15 | 32096 | 26/06/2023 | Internal administrative records | ||
| 16 | 32239 | 13/07/2023 | Personal MHS records and records considered outside the scope of another FOI request. | OIC-143597-D1T4S8 | |
| 17 | 32310 | 24/07/2023 | Communications with HSE and Firm of Solicitors | OIC-143105-T9H8T4 | |
| 18 | 32940 | 06/11/2023 | FOI request for all available and existing records relating to the accessing by staff of applicant's clinical files. | ||
| 19 | 33176 | 08/12/2023 | Requesting information exchanged between a HSE Occupational Therapist and any other HSE employee. | ||
| 20 | 33249 | 28/12/2023 | FOI request to view and inspect in person all the original clinical files regarding an internal review decision letter received. | OIC-147058-F8G0S0 | |
| 21 | 33719 | 22/03/2024 | Copy of all submissions and communication sent by the HSE to the OIC in relation to an OIC case. | OIC-151168-G9L7K7 | |
| 22 | 33919 | 30/04/2024 | Information relating to a referral by a Psychologist for private funding for a clinical Psychologist outside the HSE. | OIC 150502-Z3P0F2, OIC 149983-Q4L7H4 | |
| 23 | 33959 | 16/05/2024 | Query re response from HSE to the OIC concerning a named persons email address. | OIC 151019-K3S4G8, OIC-150481-R0B8G7 | |
| 24 | 33960 | 16/05/2024 | New FOI request seeking records that are within the scope of the request re a Data Breach. | OIC 3 - 155530-M9M0X2, OIC 2 - 151147-H4M9G1, OIC 1 - 150475-G7Y6P5 | |
| 25 | 34001 | 29/05/2024 | New FOI request seeking records that are within the scope of the request. All documents related to a Data Breach, Copy of the data breach report. Copies of all communication between the DDPO at the time and a named person. | OIC-150928-H4P8J5 | |
| 26 | 34066 | 18/06/2024 | Information relating to a referral by a Psychologist for private funding for a clinical Psychologist outside the HSE. | ||
| 27 | 34211 | 01/08/2024 | FOI request for clinical Files from the MHS | OIC-154967-T7P2T5 |
| 28 | 34754 | 12/11/2024 | Part 1: A Doctor’s Electronic Communications regarding applicant and any aspect of his healthcare. Part 2: All communications regarding the vendor setup process for applicant’s private psychological funding. | OIC-155084-N9M3N9 | |
| 29 | 34404 | 30/09/2024 | FOI request for all clinical Files from the MHS. All clinical files not already released to applicant | OIC-154965-L7K3G5 | |
| 30 | 34754 | 12/11/2024 | Part 1 – A Doctor’s electronic communications regarding applicant and any aspect of his healthcare. Part 2 – All communications regarding the vendor setup process for applicant’s private psychological funding. | OIC-155084-N9M3N9 | |
| 31 | 35147 | 17/04/2025 | Request for clinical Files from the MHS | OIC-159992-S2D0B9 | |
| 32 | 35734 | 27/08/2025 | All clinical Files from 16th of April 2025 to the most recent point of release | ||
| 33 | 35739 | 27/08/025 | Documents in any form including text messages and WhatsApp messages, email, memo, written notes or any other form related to a psychologist concerning applicant | . |
The HSE said it considers 33 requests excessive by reasonable standards. It said that at most, 10 of the 33 requests concern access to medical information. It said that as a health care provider, it has provided the applicant with access to his medical information and it is its intention to continue to provide him with access to any new medical information that is created. It said its Mental Health Services do not have any concern with processing legitimate requests for medical information. It noted that at the time of writing its submission, the applicant had submitted two new FOI requests for access to information and it provided details of those two new requests. It said that while the first of the new requests is for clinical information, the second request demonstrates once again that the applicant is following a pattern whereby his FOI request is targeting the most recent health care clinician that is providing care and treatment.
The HSE said that at the time of writing its submission the applicant had eight open complaints with the DPC. It said these complaints demonstrate a repetitive pattern, whereby interactions that the applicant has with its Mental Health Services and its Safeguarding Services trigger requests for information under the FOI Act, the purpose of which is to support his numerous complaints and alleged data breaches against staff members.
The HSE said the applicant seeks access to any information relating to him held by identified staff members and by any other HSE administrative areas/services/departments including the HSE Data Protection Office (DPO), the DDPO and the HSE Freedom of Information office. It said it appears the applicant is interested in records relating to the administration and processing of his FOI requests/Internal Reviews, Subject Access Requests, Data Breach notifications, Complaints and HSE staff who are involved in the organisation of meetings relating to him. It said that while some of the requested medical data does indeed relate to the applicant, many of the records are essentially administrative records, i.e. communications between staff members and other bodies which relate to the processing of FOI requests, internal reviews and complaints. It said that the applicant has lodged complaints with the Medical Council, Coru, and in this particular FOI request, with the Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland (NMBI), relating to a staff member at the centre of the alleged data breach. It said the applicant has already sought access to records that involved this staff member in nine separate FOI requests.
The HSE said that in light of the above, from an individual staff member’s perspective, the amount of detailed information which the applicant has requested via his FOI requests has resulted in some staff feeling harassed. It said the request for access to specific information from staff coupled with the requirements of named staff to participate in internal and external complaints processes places an enormous pressure on individual staff and on the Mental Health Services.
The HSE said that requesting clinical staff to search through their emails on repeated occasions places an extraordinary burden on a clinical resource which is already under enormous pressure. It said this pressure is exacerbated when some of the staff find themselves party to a separate complaints process. It said that as already outlined, the applicant has also referred complaints involving some of its staff to external regulatory bodies.
The HSE also provided a summary of the applicant’s eight DPC complaints, given that the FOI request under review relates to records that are part of a DPC complaint concerning an alleged data breach. It said that each one of the complaints has been the subject of an FOI request and that the third parties identified are HSE staff members and have been the subject of multiple FOI requests.
The HSE said that the nature and scope of the request under review follows the same pattern, whereby interactions that the applicant has had with its Mental Health Services triggers a complaint which is followed by an FOI request for information that includes references to HSE staff members that are involved with that service. It said Mental Health Services staff that have been involved in the applicant’s care and treatment are the subject of the open DPC complaints. It said that there are also a number of parallel complaints in progress with the professional bodies.
The HSE said that the applicant has raised a number of complaints against MHS in line with the HSE’s complaints policy, Your Service Your Say (YSYS) and the HSE Data Protection Policy. It said all of these complaints have been investigated. It said that the applicant has submitted FOI requests that are repetitive in nature and that are targeted at HSE staff who are involved in his care and/or the administration of his FOI requests, data breach allegations and complaints.
The HSE said that it considers that the applicant’s persistent submission of FOI requests for information that relates to the way the HSE manages complaints and alleged data breaches to be an abuse of the right of access to information. It said that the processing of multiple requests from the applicant and on some occasions the processing of the same information multiple times is considered excessive by reasonable standards.
The HSE said that while it does not normally consider the purpose of any request, requests from the applicant indicate that a pattern has developed whereby he both duplicates and expands the number of staff from whom he wants records/information. It said the request under review is targeted at an individual staff member. It said the request should be considered as a harassment of the individual staff member and should be considered as an abuse of the right of access to information. It said that as already mentioned, the applicant has already sought access to records that involve a specific staff member in nine separate FOI requests and has lodged a formal complaint to the staff member’s regulatory body.
The HSE said that various HSE departments, and in particular its Mental Health Services, have provided the applicant with access to his medical files and a substantial volume of records in relation to complaints, emails and general correspondence. It said that as a health care provider, it intends to continue to provide the applicant with access to any new medical information that is created.
The HSE said that it considers that the applicant is using the FOI Act for a purpose for which it was not intended, and that any reasonable person would find his repetitive submission of requests for access to administrative records, that relate to matters which are already being examined via other formal processes, to be unreasonable. It said a substantial amount of time and resources have been expended dealing with the applicant’s previous FOI requests, and, while that may have been justified for the purpose of obtaining personal medical records and records/information which relate to complaints against the HSE, it is of the view that it is not reasonable to expect significant additional time and effort should be spent sourcing and compiling the administrative records that are the subject of the current request which, as already mentioned, encompasses a request for access to information in relation to an alleged data breach currently under review by the DPC. It said its position is that the cumulative effect of this request places an unreasonable burden on the HSE’s Mental Health Services and is an abuse of the right of access to information.
The applicant made extensive, detailed submissions in response to the HSE’s submissions. While I do not intend to repeat all of the details of his submissions here, I confirm that I have considered them in full for the purposes of my decision.
Among other things, the applicant said the HSE’s latest submission is an abuse of the FOI process. He said he has previously received incredibly important information from the HSE that wouldn’t exist in his clinical file. He said his requests arise from very serious matters of personal impact and clinical and administrative significance, where transparency is both necessary and proportionate. He said any argument that involves or equates to the volume of requests should not be considered vexatious or frivolous. He said that the right of access under the FOI Act cannot be reduced to a numbers game. He argued that the number of requests made is not relevant but rather whether each request is justified, relevant, and connected to a legitimate purpose. He said he has never duplicated a request and has focused them where needed and has withdrawn some where the information had been produced or was no longer needed. He said the HSE is aiming for a decision of vexatious or frivolity to use it to block requests in the future. He said he has been aware of this since 2021 and so he is very careful with his requests to guard from this. The applicant provided background information to the alleged data breach that was the subject of the request that is under review in this decision. He said the seriousness of the matters at issue could not be described as frivolous or vexatious. He noted that the HSE had been directed by this Office to consider his request afresh and that as the HSE had cited certain other exemptions in its decisions, it had already done the work around the documents in question. He said it will be this Office’s decision to release or not and that there is no extra burden on the HSE. He said it seems clear the late introduction of section 15(1)(g) is because the HSE is very concerned that the exemptions it has already applied will not be upheld. He said it does not make sense that the HSE would claim a burden as it has made its decision and supplied some records as part of the decision with a schedule of records. He said the idea that the HSE claim the staff member feels harassment after already processing the request and applying exemptions is absurd. He said the HSE has provided misleading information concerning nine separate FOI requests involving the same staff member. He said the previous FOI requests regarding the staff member were related to a historical matter in 2018/2019. He said the current matter which involves the records at issue in this case concern the same staff member however the alleged data breach is a separate instance occurring during an investigation conducted by a regulatory body into another matter.
The applicant said that in relation to previous requests, no FOI request he made to the HSE has duplicated or trespassed on any other FOI request. He said that FOI requests to the FOI body have not been excessive by reasonable standards (33 over a six-year period). He noted that no FOI request has been adjudged as frivolous or vexatious against him and that there is only a pattern of genuine good faith engagement from him. He argued that there is no abuse of process nor of the right to access and all his requests are legitimate and have reasonable grounds. He said his engagement in these processes (under FOI) has always been reasonable, and he provided an example of a request for review which he withdrew. He said some of the 33 FOI requests stem from earlier decisions that this Office annulled and directed fresh decision-making processes. He also said that at least one request became necessary as the HSE provided the OIC with false information.
The applicant also stated that the HSE’s inclusion of information concerning his open complaints with the DPC is irrelevant to the current review. He said that it is the HSE and its employees which have necessitated further FOI requests and that on foot of a recent refusal by his current psychiatrist to confirm if a diagnosis is recorded in his file, he may submit another FOI request. He argued that the HSE’s behaviour is vexatious and an attempt to withhold important information.
It seems to me that the essence of the applicant’s argument is that all the requests he made involved very serious matters that had a personal impact on him and were necessitated by the obstructive behaviour of the HSE. As such, he considers that all his requests are legitimate and have reasonable grounds.
This Office considers that the refusal of a request under section 15(1)(g) is not something that should be undertaken lightly. As its Long Title states, the purpose of the Act is to enable members of the public to obtain access to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the public interest and the right to privacy, to information in the possession of public bodies. The Act demands that FOI bodies meet very high standards in dealing with requests. They are required to go through the rigorous processing requirements of the Act. However, we also consider that the legislation assumes reasonable behaviour on the part of the requesters.
The fact that an FOI request might be driven by a particular agenda does not mean that the request is necessarily vexatious. I fully accept that it is entirely reasonable and, indeed, commonplace, for individuals to seek to obtain access to their medical files through the use of the FOI Act. However, this does not mean that the making of requests for such records is unfettered and that such requests can never be regarded as vexatious. Similarly, I also fully accept that it is entirely reasonable that individuals who believe they may have been treated unfairly by an FOI body may first seek to use the FOI Act to access relevant records with a view to determining the grounds on which they may pursue their complaint or grievance, either with the body itself or with a relevant regulatory body such as the DPC. Nevertheless, the fact that an individual may consider that he or she has a legitimate grievance or that the matter has had a serious impact does not mean that there can be no limits to the use of FOI in the pursuit of that grievance. It is important to note that inGrange v Information Commissioner , the Court of Appeal found that an FOI request may be vexatious even if the requestor can point to a particular public interest or is pursuing a particular agenda. It found that this Office is entitled to consider the broader issue of the manner in which the requester has engaged with the FOI body.
I have outlined above the types of factors that this Office has regard to when considering whether an FOI body was justified in refusing a request under section 15(1)(g). It seems to me that a number of those factors are relevant in the circumstances of this case. First, on the matter of whether the number of requests the applicant has made is excessive by reasonable standards, I believe it is. The applicant argued that the number of requests made is irrelevant. I disagree. It seems to me that the requests made generally fall into one of two categories, namely those that are concerned with the applicant’s mental health records and those that relate to complaints or grievances that the applicant has with the HSE in respect of matters such as the standard of care provided or complaints about the handling of his personal information. In essence, the applicant’s requests all stem from his engagements with the HSE’s Mental Health Services. In my view, the submission of 33 connected requests is excessive. I see no difficulty in a requester periodically seeking access to his or her most recent medical records and I accept that any concerns a requester might have about the treatment of his or her personal information might give rise to related requests. Indeed, I note that this Office has reviewed decisions on a number of the applicant’s requests and has not to date found them to be frivolous or vexatious. Nevertheless, the applicant has continued to submit requests to such an extent that I consider the number of requests made at this stage to be excessive.
On the matter of the nature and scope of the requests, while I accept that applicant’s arguments that he has not generally made requests for the same records, the nature of the requests made and of the records sought is very relevant. In many cases, the records sought stem from the applicant’s pursuit of his complaints and grievances and would not have been in existence without the significant engagements he has generally initiated with the HSE.
On the matter of the purpose of the requests and the intent of the applicant, I believe these are key issues in this case. I accept that the applicant believes that each request is justified, relevant, and connected to a legitimate purpose. However, it seems to me that the applicant’s use of FOI has, in essence, become an integral part of his strategy for pursuing his grievances rather than representing genuine efforts to obtain access to information that might be important to his care and treatment or to the proper handling of his personal information. For example, where an individual has made a complaint to the DPC based on his or her views that a data breach has arisen, it would be reasonable, in my view, for the individual to let the matter rest with the DPC for investigation as opposed to making further related requests about the matter in the meantime and prior to the completion of any such investigation, such as the applicant has done on more than one occasion. Moreover, it seems to me that the applicant has had little or no regard to the administrative burden that his requests have imposed overall on the HSE and/or its Mental Health Services. Indeed, one can only imagine the level of disruption that might be caused to the HSE’s core services if it was required to deal with even a substantial minority of its service users to the same levels and extent as the applicant appears to expect.
Overall, I am satisfied that at this stage, submitting FOI requests has become an integral part of the applicant’s strategy in pursuing his grievances with the HSE. Having considered the nature of the current application against the background of the applicant’s ongoing prolonged interactions with the HSE, I find that the purpose of his request was directed at an objective unrelated to the right of access to records, that is, it was being used tactically for the purpose of pursuing the grievances. In the circumstances, it is my view that a pattern of conduct exists relating to the applicant’s use of FOI which suggests an abuse of the FOI process with little or no regard had for the burden which the pursuit of his grievance has placed on the HSE. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the HSE was justified in deciding to refuse the request at issue on the ground that it is vexatious.
For the sake of completeness, I would caution that this decision should not be taken as a basis for concluding that the applicant can never again seek access to further mental health records through the use of the FOI Act, although I can see no reason why both parties could not simply agree on an administrative arrangement for arranging access outside of any statutory access regime. Each request must be treated on its merits, based on the circumstances arsing at the time.
As I have found the records to be exempt under section 15(1)(g), I do not need to consider the applicability of sections 29(1), 29(1)(a), 30(1)(a) and 37(1) to the records.
Having carried out a review under section 22(2) of the FOI Act, I hereby affirm the HSE’s decision. I find that the HSE was justified in refusing the applicant’s request under section 15(1)(g) of the FOI Act, on the basis that it formed part of a pattern of manifestly unreasonable requests.
Section 24 of the FOI Act sets out detailed provisions for an appeal to the High Court by a party to a review, or any other person affected by the decision. In summary, such an appeal, normally on a point of law, must be initiated not later than four weeks after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Stephen Rafferty
Senior Investigator